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IN THE VALLEY OF THE DRY BONES1: REUNITING THE
WORD "STANDING" WITH ITS MEANING IN ANIMAL
CASES
ELIZABETH L. DECOUX*
1 The image of "dry bones" recurs in sacred stories. La Loba in Mexico finds and
rearticulates the bones of the wolf and then sings flesh and breath onto and into
him. The Egyptian Goddess Isis reassembles the body parts of her husband
Osiris and resurrects him. Ezekiel, Chapter 37, describes what happened when
Ezekiel prophesied to the many dry bones in the valley:
[Tihere was a noise, and behold a shaking, and the bones came
together, bone to his bone... And when I beheld, lo, the sinews
and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin covered them.
[A]nd the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up
upon their feet....
Ezekiel 37: 7-8, 10.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, formerly Assistant
Dean and Adjunct Instructor at the Indiana University School of Law in
Indianapolis. The author is grateful to Professor Cass Sunstein for his response
to her inquiry regarding this article. His work and that of Professor Laurence
Tribe have been invaluable to the author. She thanks Danaya Wright, who lent
her considerable talents as a nationally-recognized scholar and author to
nurture this article from its inception to its submission. She, along with Carolyn
Farmer and Diana Waldron, formed the trinity who midwived this work; the
author offers thanks to them. For reading and wisely commenting on the article,
the author thanks Rebecca Huss, Susanah Mead, George Wright, Maria Lopez,
and Bill Mansfield. For finding all the right resources, the author is also
indebted to Richard Humphries, Judith Anspach, and Miriam Murphy. For the
opportunity to teach, which led to this article, the author thanks Susanah Mead,
Norman Lefstein, Richard Hurt, Lynn McDowell, and the faculty of Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis. The author thanks her colleagues at
Florida Coastal School of Law for their insightful questions and comments. She
thanks Andrea and Robin for finding the lost disk. Finally, the author is grateful
to her students, who enlighten and inspire her, especially Kelly Burton Smith,
who brought the Washington Post series to her attention. The author dedicates
this article to MFD and the animal who was her companion, until he was killed
and made to be food, and to DLW, who loves animals and is kind to them.
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INTRODUCTION
Both the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 19582 ("HMSA")
and the Animal Welfare Act3 ("AWA"), effective in 1966, govern the
conditions of millions of animals in settings where the likelihood
of suffering is great. Both were passed at the insistence of a
populace angered by abuse in slaughterhouses and research
laboratories, and both are routinely ignored by the industries they
purport to regulate. Consequently, the cruelty which prompted
passage of the laws persists decades after the statutes were
enacted.
Although animals had no rights at early common law, U.S.
courts began recognizing their rights in the nineteenth century.4
HMSA and AWA, which purport to apply some of those rights in
specific industrial settings, are hollow promises because courts
have not consistently recognized the standing of animals suppos-
edly enjoying these and other protections.
Review of the law of standing reveals that, while certain
recognizable rules imbue that term with content, courts consider-
ing the standing of animals have separated the term from its
meaning through inconsistent decisions. Courts simply declare
some animals to have standing and others to lack standing,
without so much as a passing nod to the established precedent
governing standing determinations. Decisions regarding the
standing of animals bear no resemblance to principled application
of legal rules; they are nothing more than the raw exercise of
power over helpless creatures.
The solution to the problem of animal standing requires each
court making such a determination to explain the rationale for the
decision with reference to existing precedent. Courts performing
such analyses will often find that animals have standing. If courts
begin, now, to decide animal standing issues in a reasoned,
principled manner, courts will be prepared to address inevitable
2 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2004).
3 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2004).
4 See infra notes 200-05.
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cases in which scientific advances blur the line between human
and animal. Such a principled approach will recognize the
significance of sentience.
I. OVERVIEW
Twice in this nation's history, citizens outraged5 at an indus-
try's systematic torture6 of animals7 have demanded that the
federal government take action. In both instances, the government
passed laws that have since proven worse than useless; their very
existence gives the public the impression that the institutionalized
' William S. Blair, Humane Appeals Swamp Congress: Senate Hearing on
Livestock Slaughter Bill Stirs Wide Interest and Mail Deluge, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1958, at 84; see also Humane Slaughtering of Livestock: Hearings on S. 1213,
S. 1497, and H.R. 8308 Before the Senate Comm. of Agric. and Forestry, 85th
Cong. 67, 29-148, 327 (1958) [hereinafter Humane Slaughtering Hearings]
(testimony of Christine Stevens, President, Animal Welfare Institute).
6 "'Torture' has been defined as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain
upon the victim while he or she remains alive and conscious." State v. Odom, 928
S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996) (murder prosecution). "Torture" has also been described
as "every act, omission, or neglect by which unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or
suffering is caused, permitted, or allowed to continue, when there is a reasonable
remedy or relief." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1717.01(B) (West 2002). Acts
committed against animals can constitute torture, and, for that reason, statutes
have been enacted prohibiting the torture of animals. See, e.g., 510 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 70/4.04 (West 1993) (prohibiting the torture of law-enforcement
animals); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 10-606 (2002) (prohibition against"aggravated
cruelty to" and torture of animals). The word is used in this Article to mean the
intentional infliction of physical or mental pain. An animal's species cannot
remove the abuse of that animal from the definition of torture used in this
Article, although any animal's inability to experience pain does remove abuse
of that animal from the definition.
'Some writers use the terms "non-human animals" and "human animals," so as
not to lose sight of the fact that we humans are, ourselves, animals. See, e.g., Ani
B. Satz, The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1380,
1398-99 (2002). The terms also appear on occasion in articles addressing the
morality of patenting life forms. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask
Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 469, 536 (2003). In this Article, "animal" is used to mean "non-human
animal," and "human" is used to mean "human animal," for the sake of brevity.
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torture of animals in this country has ended when, in fact, it
continues unabated. The ineffectiveness of these and similar
statutes stems from a systemic failure of our government. Officials
with the power to enforce the law lack the will, the resources, or
both, while citizens eager to fight vigorously for animals find their
every effort thwarted by adverse, unexplained rulings on the issue
of standing.
The popular names of HMSA8 and AWA9 paint a peaceful
picture, far removed from the blood, stench, filth, and screams of
the slaughterhouse and the research laboratory. Examination of
these two failed statutes leads to a broader consideration of both
the place of animals in our society and the legal devices by which
we can best give effect to our compassionate intentions toward
them.
Among the most crucial of these legal devices is standing, an
element necessary to any attempt by a guardian or guardian ad
litem to bring a suit on behalf of an animal. To date, however, case
law regarding the standing of animals is little more than a jumble
of inconsistent decisions wholly lacking in rationale. This lack of
rationale results from courts' willingness to use the term "stand-
ing" without any connection to the legal meaning of the word. To
achieve the consistency which is a hallmark of any legitimate
system of justice, courts should evaluate the standing of animals
under the established principles of law associated with the term.
The need for courts to reconnect standing with its meaning
is particularly critical as the legal system progresses through
the twenty-first century, a span of time in which the adequacy
of the justice system and the validity of the standing doctrine
will be sorely tested by certain scientific advances, both extant
and imminent. Jurisprudence is being transformed through
these advances as dramatically and unalterably as cosmology
was transformed by the knowledge that the Earth orbits the sun.
Among these advances is the proposed reorganization of taxo-
nomy, such that humans would no longer lay exclusive claim to the
genus homo and would be joined in that genus by the chimpanzee
8 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-07 (2004).
9 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2004).
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and the bonobo. Another advance is the existence, today, of the
technology needed to create a chimera, a being that is neither
exclusively human nor exclusively animal, but a genetic combina-
tion of the two, possessing features of each.' °
These scientific changes, in concert with our consciences, call
upon our courts to persevere in the work some have haltingly
begun: development of a principled, legal framework within which
to enfold the differences, similarities, purposes, pains, pleasures,
and yearnings of animals, these "other nations, caught with
ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the
splendour and travail of the Earth.""
This Article addresses the failure of the legal system's efforts
to protect animals and suggests an effective solution: an action
brought in the animal's name by a guardian ad litem. The Article
traces these failures to use this tool to a single cause: the courts'
unacknowledged choice, in animal cases, to sever the word "stand-
ing" from its meaning and use the word, instead, to signify a
judge's arbitrary decision as to who can and cannot enter a court.
Part II documents the failure of HMSA and AWA and
describes the suffering animals endure in spite of and sometimes
because of those laws. Part III places HMSA and AWA in the
context of a brief history of the rights of animals in the United
States. Part IV explores the connection between those failed
statutes and the law of standing, describing the inconsistent,
inexplicable decisions in which courts have addressed the standing
of animals. Part V moves beyond the law regarding standing and
identifies some of the larger philosophical, ethical, and scientific
issues that arise when serious consideration is given to the
standing of animals, concluding that there is error in viewing them
as the "other" whose interests and rights need not be considered.
Part VI looks to the future as an era when recognizing the
standing of animals will allow people to be their best and most
creative selves.
10 See Jamie Shreeve, The Other Stem Cell Debate, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 10,
2005, at 42; see also infra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
'
1 HENRYBESTON, THE OUTERMOST HOUSE: A YEAR OF LIFE ON THE GREAT BEACH
OF CAPE COD 25 (1928).
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II. THE FAILURE OF HMSA AND AWA IN THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE
AND THE RESEARCH LABORATORY
HMSA and AWA have failed. If animals could not feel pain,
the failure might be of less consequence. It is well settled, however,
that animals do feel pain, as established by the very scientists who
experiment on animals. The primary membership organization for
those who conduct research on animals is the American Associa-
tion of Laboratory Animal Scientists ("AALAS"). An important
publication available from AALAS is its Guide for the Care and
Use of Laboratory Animals,2 which includes this statement:
An integral component of veterinary medical care is
prevention or alleviation of pain associated with
procedural and surgical protocols. Pain is a complex
experience that typically results from stimuli that
damage tissue or have the potential to damage
tissue. The ability to experience and respond to pain
is widespread in the animal kingdom.... In general,
unless the contrary is known or established it should
be assumed that procedures that cause pain in
humans also cause pain in animals. 3
Not only do scientists recognize that animals experience pain,
but articles in medical journals also regularly describe various
methods of causing animals pain. At least one lengthy issue of a
scholarly journal is devoted entirely to a description of methods
for causing pain to animals. 4
The intentional infliction of physical or mental suffering is
torture. Therefore, the widespread infliction of such suffering on
12 INSTITUTE OF LABORATORY ANIMAL RESOURCES, GUIDE FOR THE CARE AND USE
OF LABORATORY ANIMALS (1996), available at http://www.netlibrary.coml. This
book is also available for purchase from the AALAS web site at http://www.
aalas.org.
13 Id. at 64.
14 See G.F. Gebhart, Introduction, 40 INST. LABORATORYANIMALRES. J. 95 (1999)
(including four Articles in an issue entitled Animal Models of Pain).
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animals in slaughterhouses and research laboratories, in violation
of HMSA and AWA, is a crime that the citizens of a decent society
have a duty to stop.
A. The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act and the Thorough-
going Consistency with Which the Slaughter Industry Has
Ignored It
After a false start or two, Congress, in 1958, undertook earnest
consideration of a bill requiring that the slaughter of animals used
for food be humane. 5 The impetus for the legislation was the
public's growing awareness of atrocities that were routinely
committed in slaughterhouses and the public's resulting demand
that the government take action.' 6 The Chair of the Senate
Agriculture Committee, during hearings on the humane-slaughter
bill, stated that "he never had 'so much pressure in all [his]
twenty-two years' in Congress."' 7 While the bill was pending,
Congress received more letters about the suffering of animals in
slaughterhouses than about any other matter then under consider-
ation.'"
Also in 1958, the testimony during four days of hearings
before the Senate Committee on Agriculture amply demonstrated
why the public was so concerned about conditions in slaughter-
houses. For example, a letter from a former meat inspector, W. P.
Holcombe, was read to the Committee and entered into the record.
Holcombe wrote that "[n]o member of the committee . . . is
qualified to act on this legislation without first making a casual
inspection of actual [slaughter] operations. Unless the inspection
is made incognito, I assure you a group of legislators would be
presented with a staged performance comparable to a conducted
tour of Russia."' 9 Holcombe proceeded to describe what the




" Humane Slaughtering Hearings, supra note 5, at 67 (statement of Madeleine
Bemelmans, President, Society for Animal Protection Legislation). There is no
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committee would see if they did pay such a clandestine visit to a
slaughterhouse:
a long line of helpless, healthy, fully conscious hogs,
sheep, cruelly shackled and dangling from one leg,
twisting, squirming and screaming in agony as they
approach the executioner .... Perhaps a close ob-
server might have noted a hideously gruesome
elongation of that poor shackled leg as a bone
snapped, or the joint pulled from its socket.... They
reached the end of the line too soon, their agonized
screams smothered as they dropped mercilessly, still
conscious into a vat of scalding water."0
Describing the method for preparing cattle to be shackled and
hoisted, Holcombe wrote:
[a] powerful human being expertly swings a heavy
sledge as the condemned creatures move past him. If
they are lucky they crumple in partial consciousness.
.. Many of them [do] not, and many revive to linger
in agony as they are suspended to bleed out. Quite
frequently the helpless animal receives a preliminary
broken snout, an ear sheared off, or an eye gouged
out from a misdirected blow of the sledge.2 '
Another witness, Christine Stevens, testified that she had watched
the man wielding the sledgehammer at one slaughterhouse and
had seen him land as many as thirteen blows with the sledge on a
single animal.22 She also described animals struggling after being
shackled by a back leg and hung by a chain on a conveyer belt.23
indication that the members of the Senate Agriculture Committee or the
Congress followed Holcombe's suggestion and visited a slaughterhouse.20 Id. at 68.
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She saw some twist so violently that they tore off a foot or broke a
leg or the pelvis.24
The retired inspector, Holcombe, concluded his written
statement by asking, "[wihat happiness can be derived from the
profits of such sadistic cruelty. I am thinking of the advice Jesus
gave his disciples: 'For even as ye do it to the least of these, so do
ye it unto Me.' 25
Congress passed HMSA, and President Eisenhower signed it
into law. The essence of the statute is a requirement that "animals
[be] rendered insensible to pain"26 before workers shackle a back
leg, attach a chain to that shackle, and attach the other end of the
chain to the overhead conveyer that hoists the animal and moves
her inexorably to each station of the slaughter assembly to be
eviscerated and skinned. The humane societies that had worked
hard for HMSA's passage, along with the legislators who had voted
for it in the face of stiff opposition from the slaughter industry,
likely felt a sense of accomplishment and relief that the agony of
animals in slaughterhouses had ended. That sense of relief was ill-
founded, however, because, by 2001-and likely decades earlier-
violations of HMSA were routine.
The depth of the slaughter industry's disregard for HMSA is
apparent from a reading of the 2001 Washington Post series of two
articles. The articles document that Congress need not have
bothered to pass HMSA. For example, HMSA requires that
animals be rendered "insensible to pain" before they are hung by
one leg from the conveyor mechanism.2" The method used for
rendering the animals insensible to pain, in most slaughterhouses,
24Id.
25Humane Slaughtering Hearings, supra note 5, at 78 (citation omitted).
26 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2004).
27 See Joby Warrick, 'They Die Piece by Piece': In Overtaxed Plants, Humane
Treatment of Cattle is Often a Battle Lost, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at Al
[hereinafter Warrick, Piece by Piece]; Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting to
Happen: Beef-Inspection Failures Let In a Deadly Microbe, WASH. POST, Apr. 10,
2001, at Al.
21 Warrick, Piece by Piece, supra note 27, at A28.
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is a blow to the front of the head with a captive bolt gun.29 A
captive bolt gun, if functioning as designed and used as intended,
delivers a powerful blow to the animal between the eyes.3 ° The
Washington Post series demonstrates, however, that the under-
paid, poorly trained, rushed3 1 slaughterhouse employees operating
the captive bolt gun often do not succeed in rendering the animals
"insensible to pain." In this article, slaughterhouse employees also
confirm that, contrary to the requirements of the statute, many
animals survive, not only alive but also conscious, at those stations
of the slaughter line known as "the tail cutter, the belly ripper, and
the hide puller."32
The incidents described by these workers are not isolated.
Lester Friedlander, a veterinarian and former government
inspector at a Pennsylvania hamburger plant, told the Washington
Post that such violations happen in "plants all over the United
States... on a daily basis .... I've seen it happen. And I've talked
to other veterinarians. They feel it's out of control."33 Conscious
"cattle, dangling [upside down] by a leg from the plant's overhead
chain [assembly], twist and arch their backs as though trying to
right themselves."" As further confirmation that these incidents
are not isolated, a veteran slaughterhouse employee stated that he
had "seen thousands and thousands of cows go through the
slaughter process alive .... I've been in the side-puller where
they're still alive. All the hide is stripped out down the neck
there."3" Another slaughterhouse worker described living cows
dangling by a leg from the assembly line chain: "They move the
head and the eyes and the leg like the cow wants to walk."36
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 One expert compares the speed of the modern-day slaughter house killing floor
to the assembly line of the candy factory in an episode of the television series I
Love Lucy. Id.32 Id. at Al.
33 Id.
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Pigs fare no better. Because their skin is tougher than cows'
skin, pigs are lowered into scalding water, supposedly after they
are rendered "insensible to pain."37 The hot water is intended to
soften the pig's skin so it can be removed more easily.3" Pigs, which
according to HMSA should have already been rendered "insensible
to pain," have been seen "squealing and kicking as they are being
lowered" to drown in scalding water.39
These horrors have a familiar ring. Although the articles were
published in 2001, their descriptions could have been taken
directly from the testimony before the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry more than forty years earlier, testimony
that led to enactment of a law that has been ignored as a matter
of course.4 ° It is not known whether W. P. Holcombe, or other
citizens who worked for passage of or testified in support of the
HMSA bill, were alive when the Washington Post published its
series in 2001. Anyone who worked or voted for HMSA in 1958
must have been saddened and dismayed to read that their efforts
had gone for naught.
With the atrocities exposed once more in 2001 by the Washing-
ton Post, Congress took some action, but again to little effect. For
example, on July 9, 2001, three months after the Washington Post
series was published, an outraged Senator Robert Byrd4 delivered
a speech on the floor of the U.S. Senate in which he described the
violations uncovered by the Washington Post and added these
words: "[o]h, these are animals, yes. But they, too, feel pain."4 2 The
Senator's words are reminiscent of those written by William





40 See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
41 A Democrat from West Virginia, Byrd is regarded as the Dean of the Senate.
See, e.g., Jerry Hagstrom, Agriculture-Ag Secretary Quizzed Over Allegiances
On New Labeling Law, National Journal CongressDaily (May 9, 2003), at
http://national journal.conpubs/congressdaily/.
42 147 Cong. Rec. S7311 (statement of Senator Robert Byrd).
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Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions[,] fed with
the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject
to the same diseases, healed by the same means,
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer
... ? if you prick us do we not bleed?... if you poison
us do we not die?43
The only feature enumerated by Shylock that animals do not have
in common with us-a lack of reciprocity for which humans should
be grateful-is,"And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?""
Just as Senator Byrd's speech brings to mind the words of
Shakespeare, Shylock's questions in turn evoke the words of Nobel
Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer, a Polish Jew who fled during
Adolf Hitler's rise to power, arriving in the United States in 1935.
Writing of institutionalized cruelty to animals, he issues this
indictment: "In relation to [animals], all people are Nazis; for the
animals it is an eternal Treblinka."4 5
With magnanimity similar to that of Singer, Pulitzer Prize
winner Alice Walker does not begrudge the animals a place on the
hard-fought ground she has won as an African-American woman.
Rather, she writes that the "animals of the world exist for their
own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black
people were made for whites or women for men."46
Through the efforts of Senator Byrd and others, Congress
passed, as part of a 2002 farm bill, what has proven to be an
43 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OFVENICE 73 (John Russell Brown ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1955).
44Id.
" Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Letter Writer, in COLLECTED STORIES: GIMPEL THE
FOOL TO LETTER WRITER 750 (Ilan Stavans ed., Literary Classics of the U.S.,
2004) (1968). Singer's words inspired the title of Charles Patterson's book,
Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, published by
Lantern Books in 2002, with a foreword by Lucille Rosen Kaplan, Esq. CHARLES
PATTERSON, ETERNAL TREBLINKA: OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS AND THE
HOLOCAUST vii (2002).
4" Alice Walker, Preface to MARJORIE SPIEGEL, THE DREADED COMPARISON:
HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 13, 14 (1988).
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ineffective sense-of-the-Congress resolution urging full enforce-
ment of HMSA" Given Senator Byrd's outrage and the appropria-
tion of funds for better enforcement, the industry and agency that
were caught in such flagrant disregard of the law might have been
expected to see the error of their ways.
To the contrary, thousands of animals continue to suffer in
slaughterhouses every day. For instance, during a Senate Agricul-
ture Appropriations Subcommittee Meeting hearing on May 8,
2003-more than two years after the Washington Post se-
ries-Senator Byrd criticized the Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture ("USDA"), Ann Veneman, for failing to enforce
HMSA at slaughterhouses.4 8 "Despite the laws on the books,
chronically weak enforcement and intense pressure to speed up
slaughterhouse assembly lines reportedly have resulted in animals
being skinned, dismembered and boiled while they are still alive
and conscious," Senator Byrd told Secretary Veneman, in a sad
echo of the testimony that prompted HMSA.49 Byrd also questioned
Veneman about the failure to hire additional inspectors.5 °
Veneman responded that USDA "[was] still writing job descrip-
tions for the" additional inspectors.5 ' Byrd noted that Congress
had already appropriated "funds to hire inspectors for two years
in a row and said he was 'really surprised' he had to talk to her a
second time while 'the suffering of these animals is going on.' 52
Confirming that atrocities continue, the U.S. General Account-
ing Office ("GAO") issued a report on January 30, 2004, revealing
that in a twenty-eight month period surrounding the Washington
Post's publication of the series on slaughterhouses,53 there were at
least 553 instances of noncompliance with federal law at U.S.
4' Enforcement of Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 107-
171, § 10305, 116 Stat. 133, 493-94 (2002).
4' Hagstrom, supra note 41.
41 Chelsea Purvis, Sustainable Farms Offer More Humane Option, YALE DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article
functions/Printerfriendly.asp?AID=24168.
" Hagstrom, supra note 41.
51 Id.
52 Id.
13 See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
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slaughterhouses.5 4 The report also revealed that the most preva-
lent type ofnoncompliance was allowing animals that had not been
properly stunned to proceed, conscious, through the slaughter
line.55 A similarly disturbing fact documented in this report is the
lack of reaction from USDA inspectors when they see multiple
animals proceeding through the slaughter line alive and conscious;
more than half the time, the inspectors, although they make a
record of the violation, nevertheless allow the slaughter line to
continue propelling live, conscious animals through its stations.56
Not only do the inspectors fail to stop the line and remedy the
violations, as they have the power and are in fact required to do,
but they also fail to document the number of improperly stunned
animals covered by a single report of a violation, making knowl-
edge about the number of animals tortured in this manner
impossible to ascertain.57 Therefore, it is possible, though not
documented, that a single report of a violation affecting multiple
animals will actually reflect many hundreds of animals being
skinned and boiled alive while still conscious. 8
There is additional evidence that Senator Byrd's concerns are
well-founded and that, just as he told Secretary Veneman, the
suffering continues. In 2003, several weeks after Senator Byrd
questioned Secretary Veneman about USDA's failure, for two years
in a row, to hire enough additional inspectors to enforce HMSA, a
gate became blocked at a Beardstown, Illinois slaughterhouse.59
This incident occurred during the hot summer days, and trucks
transporting pigs remained lined up outside the slaughterhouse,
54 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: USDA
HAS ADDRESSED SOME PROBLEMS BUT STILL FACES ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
4 (Jan. 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=gao&docid=f:d04247.pdf. Violations were found at"272 facilities across
the United States." Id.55 Id.
56See id. at 5.
7 See id. at 4.
5
" See id. at 4-5.
" Charlyn Fargo & Natalie Morris, Excel Plant Reopens; Hogs' Heat Deaths
Preceded Closure, S. J. REG., Aug. 29, 2003, at 1.
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unable to enter because of the blocked gate.6" USDA inspectors
were on-site at the slaughterhouse, but they stood by, taking no
action at all. After a period of several days, during which the
temperatures reached the high 90s each day, over eleven hundred
pigs trapped in the transport trucks had died slow deaths from the
heat.6' The USDA official responsible for managing the agency's
inspectors, including those at the slaughterhouse with the blocked
gate, addressed the inspectors at a USDA convention in October
2003, a few months after the heat deaths. He asked, "Is it such a
stretch of the imagination ... [wihen animals are dying in large
numbers in transporters awaiting slaughter-day after day-that
there may be something inhumane about these losses and it is
our responsibility to intervene?"62
Even if USDA enforced HMSA fully and without exception,
deliberate cruelty would still be a regular practice or, in some
cases, an "industry standard."6 3 For example, in 2003, the owner
of a factory egg farm decided to dispose of 30,000 hens who no
longer laid enough eggs. To kill them, he had workers dump all
30,000 of them, alive and conscious, into a wood chipper.65 A
neighbor reported this conduct to the authorities, but no govern-
ment agency took any action to stop the factory farmer or to
prevent him from taking the same action in the future.66 Laying
hens are not within the coverage of HMSA. State anti-cruelty laws
did apply to the hens, but the prosecutor refused to bring any
charges, stating, through a spokesperson, that feeding live hens
into a wood chipper is "industry standard."67
60Id.
61 Id.
62 Elizabeth Weise, Food Safety Chief Scolds Inspectors, USA TODAY, Nov. 11,
2003, at A8 (emphasis added).
63 Elizabeth Fitzsimmons, Two Won't Face Cruelty Charges, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Apr. 12, 2003, at B7.
64 Jia-Rui Chong, Wood-Chipped Chickens Fuel Outrage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2003, at B1.
65 Id.
66 Fitzsimmons, supra note 63.
67 Id.
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The government that promised to stop inhumane slaughter by
passage of HMSA has failed to do so in any remotely adequate
way. Instead, employees of the slaughter industry skin, eviscerate,
dehoove, and boil thousands of living, fully conscious animals
every day as federal inspectors watch. Meanwhile, because
chickens, fish, and other small animals are not even protected by
HMSA, there is no documentation of the numbers of these animals
that are fed into wood chippers or boiled alive simply because they
no longer serve a useful purpose for humans.
B. The Animal Welfare Act, Its Illusory Nature and the Suffer-
ing of Animals
Life magazine, in its February 1966 issue, published an article
entitled Concentration Camp for Dogs,68 which described dealers'
trafficking in dogs and cats to be used in medical experiments.69 A
photograph of a skeletal, cowering dog accompanied the article. °
"Life received more mail on [that article] than any story in the
history of the magazine-more letters than Life got on Vietnam."7
The public outcry following the publication of Concentration
Camp for Dogs resulted in congressional hearings on proposed laws
to regulate animal traffickers and research laboratories.7 2 During
those hearings, lawmakers learned that dogs used in research
laboratories were kept in cages, without reprieve, for three or four
years, that waste was hosed out of cages with the dogs still inside,
and that many dogs caught a claw or a toe in the mesh bottom of
68 Silva, Concentration Camp for Dogs, LIFE, Feb. 4, 1966, at 22.
69 Christine Stevens, Remarks at Symposium on the Animal Welfare Act:
Historical Perspectives and Future Directions (Sept. 12,1996), at http://nal.usda.
gov/awic/pubs/96symp/awasymp.htm.70 Id.
71 Id. For additional information about the public outrage that prompted the
passage of HMSA, see Amy Mosel, Comment, What about Wilbur? Proposing a
Federal Statute to Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions for Farm
Animals Raised for Food Production, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133 (2001).
72 Animal Dealer Regulation: Hearings Before the Comm. On Commerce, 89th
Cong. 29 (1966).
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a cage and suffered greatly until someone noticed.73 The lawmak-
ers also learned of a case in which dogs were taken outside after
surgery and tied to stakes, without shelter, behind the research
laboratory.74 While these hearings continued, the Christian Science
Monitor published an editorial in support of the proposed laws,
entitled Must Mercy Wait?
75
The promise of mercy, at least, came quickly. In 1966,
Congress passed the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act ("LAWA"). 76
While continuing the regulation of animal traffickers, amendments
in 1970, 1976, 1985, and 1990 broadened the scope of its
protections to include not only animals in research laboratories,
but also animals to be used in zoos and pet shops.77 Accordingly,
the revisions changed the popular name to the Animal Welfare
Act.
Congress states that the purpose of AWA is "to insure that
animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition
purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treat-
ment,"78 and "to [require] the humane handling, care, treatment,
and transportation of animals by ... research facilities .. .
With this law on the books, animal advocates may have breathed
a sigh of relief, just as they had in 1958 when HMSA was passed.
This sense of relief was ill-founded, however, just as it had been in
1958.
A review of AWA and USDA regulations promulgated
pursuant to AWA reveals that AWA's protections are largely
illusory because almost all the "requirements" can be waived by
the research laboratory's veterinarian or by the principal investi-
gator. To waive the "requirements," the veterinarian or investiga-
tor needs only to place a statement in a file and in an annual
73 Id. at 129-48.
74 Id. at 138.
7' Editorial, Must Mercy Wait?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1965.
76 See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131-2159 (2002). This section of this
Article, exploring AWA, focuses primarily on animals in research laboratories.
77Id.
7511d. § 2131.
791 Id. § 2143(a)(1).
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report to USDA describing why AWA and its implementing
regulations need not be followed."0 It is difficult to view a law as
regulatory when the researchers who are allegedly regulated can
waive every provision of the law. Such an arrangement is particu-
larly troubling when the individuals who can choose whether to
follow the provisions of AWA are scientists, to whom the Secretary
of Agriculture is likely to defer. Yet the public clearly wants the
biomedical research industry regulated, or the public would not
have insisted on AWA's passage.8' Exploring individual provisions
of AWA, emphasizing the waiver provisions and vague terms,
reveals its weaknesses.
AWA requires the Secretary of USDA to promulgate regula-
tions "to ensure that animal pain and distress are minimized."82
These regulations are to include provisions regarding adequate
veterinary care and the appropriate use of anesthetics, analgesics,
tranquilizers, and euthanasia.
With regard to any procedure likely to cause the animal pain,
the standards promulgated by the Secretary shall include the
following requirements:
(i) that a doctor of veterinary medicine is consulted in
the planning of the procedure;' (ii) for the use of
tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics; 5 (iii) for
pre-surgical and post-surgical care by laboratory
workers, in accordance with [appropriate] veterinary
medical and nursing standards;8 6 (iv) against the use
of paralytics without anesthesia; 7 and (v) that the
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
82 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (a)(3)(A) (2002).
83 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C).
14 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(i).
85 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(ii).
86 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(iii) (emphasis added).
87 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(iv). This requirement is included because of a particularly
gruesome practice by researchers that would use paralytics on animals without
anesthesia, with the result that the animal can suffer but cannot move.
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withholding of tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia,
or euthanasia when scientifically necessary shall
continue for only the necessary period of time .... 8
With similarly significant room for interpretation, AWA
mandates that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate regulations
requiring that an animal that has been used in one major proce-
dure not be used in another, "except in cases of (i) scientific
necessity; or (ii) other special circumstances as determined by the
Secretary." 9 Then, the scant protections that AWA has given with
one hand, it takes away with the other. For instance, AWA
immediately removes many of the protections it purports to
provide by specifying that nothing can "be construed as authoriz-
ing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with
regard to the performance of actual research or experimentation
by a research facility"9" or the "design, outlines, or guidelines of
actual research or experimentation,"91 except for certain enumer-
ated sections of AWA.
The parts of the law that the Secretary may not enforce via
regulation, rule, or order with regard to research include the
requirement that a scientist weigh other options in any procedures
that will probably cause pain or distress, and the requirements
discussed earlier.92 As if the exceptions did not water down the
rule enough, AWA requires the Secretary to include in the regu-
lations "that exceptions to [the] standards may be made only when
specified by research protocol and that any such exception shall be
detailed and explained in a report outlined under paragraph (7)
and filed with the Institutional Animal Committee."93 The use of
the word "only" causes an ordinary reader to believe that what
comes after that word will be very restrictive. Of course, what
comes after the word "only" is essentially nothing-put it in the
protocol and put it in the annual report.
88 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(v) (2002) (emphasis added).
8 9Id. § 2143(a)(3)(D) (emphasis added).
90 Id. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(ii).
91 Id. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i).
92 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(B); see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
9 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(E) (2002) (emphasis added).
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It is quite possible that scientists, or those who prepare
documents for them, have boilerplate language to be inserted in
the protocol and the annual report in satisfaction of the ominous-
sounding "only." The "rule" that exceptions can be made only when
specified by research protocol is not an actual rule; it is illusory.
When could an explanation for violating a standard not be
included in a protocol? There is nothing to prevent a researcher
from including such an explanation in every single protocol he or
she writes. The researcher is not even required to obtain approval
from the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee ("IACUC")
appointed by the research laboratory's chief executive. More
straightforward drafting would have resulted in a provision
stating: "Scientists and research facilities are not required to abide
by the Animal Welfare Act or the regulations promulgated
pursuant to that Act unless they want to; if they do not wish to
comply, all they need to do is to say so in the file and in their
annual report."
The referenced paragraph 7 in AWA specifies what must
appear in the protocol and/or the annual report to USDA: (1) a
statement that the provisions of AWA are being followed;94 (2) a
statement that the research facility is following "professionally
acceptable standards governing the care, treatment, and use of
animals ...during actual research or experimentation";" (3)
"information on procedures likely to produce pain or distress in
any animal and assurances demonstrating that the principal
investigator considered alternatives to those procedures";9 6 (4)
"assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that [the] facility is
adhering to the standards described in this section"; 7 and (5) "an
explanation for any deviation from the standards" set by the
Secretary.9" The explanation for such deviations from the rules
does not even have to be approved by the Institutional Animal
Committee; it need only be filed with that committee.99
94 1d. § 2143(a)(7)(A).
95Id. § 2143(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added).96Id. § 2143(a)(7)(i) (emphasis added).
97 Id. § 2143(a)(7)(ii) (emphasis added).
98 Id. § 2143(a)(7)(iii).
99 7 U.S.C. § 2143(3) (2002).
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Further, as if this exception in this Section of AWA had not
effectively excised the Act from the United States Code, AWA and
the regulations promulgated pursuant to AWA are rife with
further equivocations. These equivocations appear in the following
descriptions, taken from AWA, of how an animal comes to find
himself inside a research laboratory, and what scientists are
permitted to do to him there.
Dealers who sell animals to research facilities must, with
certain exceptions, be licensed.' ° There is an exception to the
license requirement for any person who does not derive a substan-
tial portion of his income, the meaning of substantial to be
determined by the Secretary, from breeding dogs or cats on his own
premises.' A dealer must hold an animal for at least five business
days before selling it to a research facility, unless the Secretary
provides otherwise.0 2 A research facility may not obtain an animal
for use in an experiment other than by purchasing the animal from
a dealer licensed by or exempted from license by USDA or at an
animal auction.0 3 Research facilities, dealers and auction faci-
lities must allow law enforcement officers onto their premises to
look for lost animals.
10 4
AWA further requires the Secretary of Agriculture to estab-
lish regulations that will ensure the minimization of pain and
distress to laboratory animals.0 5 The regulations promulgated by
the Secretary charge each research facility's IACUC with the
responsibility for ensuring that any research "[b] e performed with
appropriate sedatives, analgesics or anesthetics, unless withhold-
ing such agents is justified for scientific reasons, in writing, by the
principal investigator and will continue for only the necessary
period of time.'0 6
100 7 U.S.C. § 2134 (2002).
101 Id. §§ 2133, 2137.
102 Id. § 2135.
103 Id. § 2137.
104 Id. § 2147.
105 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(A).
106 9 C.F.R. § 2.31 (d)(1)(iv)(A) (emphasis added).
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IACUC is appointed by the chief executive of each research
facility; 1 7 it must consist of at least three members, at least one of
whom is a veterinarian, and at least one of whom represents the
community's concerns about animal welfare.' The community
member should have no ties to the research facility other than his
service on the committee.'0 9 All members must have an adequate
ability to evaluate the proposals the committee considers, with
particular attention to the treatment and care of animals."0
Twice a year IACUC must inspect facilities where animals are
kept, along with the areas in which studies are conducted, to
review the condition of the animals and the manner in which
animals' pain is addressed."' After each inspection, IACUC files a
report with the research facility, identifying any violations found
during the inspection."12 If the research facility fails to correct the
deficiencies after receiving the report and being given an opportu-
nity to remedy the deficiencies, IACUC shall report the violations
to USDA." 3
A federal agency that funds research and becomes aware of
violations at a research facility of AWA or its regulations shall
suspend the facility's funding for the research, although the
research facility has the option to appeal." 4 The Secretary of
Agriculture is authorized to seek an injunction to prohibit viola-
tions of AWA. 1 5 The Secretary lacks not only the authority to
intervene in the design of a project," 6 but also the ability to stop
107 Id. § 2.31 (b)(1).
10 Id. § 2.3 1(b)(3). The "community" member is not elected, so he is not literally
representative of the concerns of the community. He is appointed by the
executive officer of the research laboratory. Id.
109 Id. § 2.3 1(b)(3)(ii).
110 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1) (2002).
111 Id. § 2143(b)(3). Although not completely clear, it appears from this regu-
lation that the institution need not allow IACUC members to see the animal
facilities any more often than twice per year, even though some members likely
work at the institution.112 Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A).
113 Id. § 2143(b)(3).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i) (2002).
702
IN THE VALLEY OF THE DRY BONES
research as it progresses; 117 the Secretary can, however, tempo-
rarily suspend a facility's license for violations, with routes of
appeal and review open to both the Secretary and the research
facility." 8 The research facility must train all individuals who
work with animals, including scientists, on such topics as humane
practices in research, eliminating or reducing pain, and methods
for reporting any deficiencies in the facility's compliance with
AWA and its regulations." 9
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary that purport to
relate to the humane handling, care, and treatment of animals are
voluminous. Regardless of their quantity, the focus of these
regulations on specific types of food and certain means of ventila-
tion makes them so much sound and fury. The regulations signify
nothing, given their failure to establish specific, enforceable
requirements to stop the suffering of animals in laboratories. For
instance, the pressing issues that have concerned animal welfare
organizations for a number of years include exercise for dogs and
psychological stimulation for non-human primates. The current
standards in the Code of Federal Regulations provide, for example,
that an enclosure for dogs must be at least six inches taller than
the height of the tallest dog in the enclosure. 2 ° A dog should have
at least the amount of floor space provided for in this calculation:
the length in inches from the base of the dog's tail to the tip of
the nose, plus six inches, squared.' 2 ' That figure is the minimum
square inches for that dog's enclosure.'22
Thus, a small dog that would measure ten inches from the
base of the tail to the tip of the nose would be allowed roughly 1.8
square feet of floor space. Furthermore, a dog is viewed as having
sufficient exercise if he is allowed in a pen that is twice the
minimum for his floor space.'23 For instance, a greyhound measur-
ing twenty-five inches from the base of the tail to the tip of the
117 Id. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(iii).
1
'l Id. § 2149.
119 Id. § 2143(d)
120 9 C.F.R. § 3.6(c)(1)(iii) (2004).
121 Id. § 3.6(c)(1)(i).
122 Id.
23 Id. § 3.8(a).
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nose has adequate space for his exercise needs if he is in a cage
twice the allowable minimum living space for a dog his size. A
greyhound would therefore have "adequate" space for exercise if he
were kept his entire life in a space smaller than a three by five foot
bathroom.12
4
The regulations relating to social grouping for non-human
primates require only that the social needs of the primates be
addressed according to "current standards," as directed by the
attending veterinarian.'25 Where the public has called for a
solution, Congress has largely delegated responsibility to USDA,
and USDA has called for a veterinarian's application of an
unspecified standard.'2 6 Such a veterinarian is dependent, for his
or her salary, on the research facility that is supposedly subject to
these "rules."'27
The regulations further state that the environment of non-
human primates must be enriched by making available to the
primates the means of expressing activities that are typical to
their species. 2 s Examples of these means are perches, swings,
mirrors, and even "interaction" with humans who feed them and
clean their cages. 2 9 Federal regulations allow workers to clean the
cages by hosing them out while the primates are still in them, so
long as the enclosure is not so tiny that the primate would be
124 A greyhound measuring twenty-five inches from the base of the tail to the tip
of the nose would be allowed 961 square inches of space for living ((25 + 6)2 = 961
square inches of floor space for living quarters). 961 square inches is roughly 6.7
square feet. When that size is doubled, for the exercise space, the greyhound is
considered, by the terms of AWA and its implementing regulations, to have
adequate space for exercise if the dog has access to a space measuring 13.4
square feet, which is less than the size of a three by five foot bathroom (fifteen
square feet). The inadequacy of such a provision, given the dog's lot, is all too
obvious. Even an ideal provision about exercise, giving a greyhound acres on
which to run, would not alter the dog's suffering when the dog is subjected to
inescapable electric shock.




128 Id. § 3.81(b).
129Id.
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wetted, harmed, or distressed. 30 A research facility could consider
a non-human primate to be receiving adequate psychological
stimulation because a human "interacted" with the primate by
making her move to one side of her cage to avoid the blast of a
hose.
The regulations do not include specifications as to the quantity
of articles for psychological enrichment, nor do they specify
whether each cage must have such articles, or merely the primate
area as a whole.' This lack of specificity makes the regulation
largely ineffective. For example, in an area where thirty primates
live in individual cages, personnel at the laboratory might place a
single, small mirror at a point visible from each of the thirty cages
and consider the facility in compliance with the "must"'32 of this
regulation.
Several provisions throughout AWA impose significant docu-
mentation and record-keeping requirements on each research
facility.'33 Despite detailed record-keeping and AWA, animals
suffer. Moreover, Congress has made even the minimal protections
of AWA inapplicable to rats, birds, and mice by excluding them
from the definition of "animal."'34 Rats, birds, and mice constitute
more than ninety percent of the animals used in research. 3 '
Catherine Dell'Orto, a veterinarian and post-doctoral fellow at
Columbia University, complained to university officials in 2001
that animals used in surgical experiments at Columbia were not
given relief from pain after they awoke from anesthetic.'39 Specifi-
cally, she reported that baboons were anesthetized and then
13 Id. § 3.84(a).
131 See 9 C.F.R. § 3.84(a) (2004).
132Id.
133 See 9 C.F.R. § 2.35 (2004) (noting the various records that each animal
research facility must maintain).
134 See 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2002). "The term animal means any live or dead dog,
cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such
other warm-blooded animal... but such term excludes birds, rats,.. . and mice
... "). Id.
135 Siri Carpenter, OfMice (and Rats and Birds) and Amendments, 32 MONITOR
ON PSYCHOL. (2001), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb0l/mice.html.
13' Associated Press, Columbia Still Entangled in Lab Probe, Oct. 12, 2003
[hereinafter Entangled in Lab Probe].
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subjected to surgeries in which an eyeball was removed. 4 ° A clamp
was then placed inside each animal's eye socket to cut the flow of
an artery, and subsequently the animals were returned to their
cages without painkillers.' 4' Awaking from anesthesia without any
analgesics, the baboons suffered prolonged deaths with no relief
from pain when they should have been euthanized given their
condition.'4 2 Dell'Orto reported that she was shunned by her
Columbia colleagues after registering her complaints, and she
now has a private veterinary practice.4
3
At Louisiana State University, neurosurgeon Michael Carey
conducted experiments over a period of years in which hundreds of
anesthetized cats were shot in the head."' Carey did not provide
painkillers to the cats who survived, claiming that after being shot
in the head "none appeared to be in any pain."'45 At Congress's
urging, the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") investigated
the $2 million experiment and Louisiana State University
suspended the experiment. 46 At the conclusion of its review, GAO
asked the U.S. Army to decide whether the experiments should
continue. 4 7 The Army decided that the experiments should end, a
decision about which "Carey was furious." "'
The scope and variety of institutional animal abuses that exist
despite AWA are staggering. The ILAR Journal published an
article which discussed different methods of producing pain in
animals.'4 9 Scientists documented that some researchers place a
140 1d.
141 Brendan Pierson, PETA Files Suit Against Columbia U. Experiments on
Baboons, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, Mar. 8, 2004.
142 Entangled in Lab Probe, supra note 139.
143 Id.
14' Editorial: Needless Cruelty, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11, 1989.
141 Id. Carey was relying on the idea that the tissue of the brain itself has no
pain sensors. The projectiles fired into the cats' brains passed through skin and
bone before reaching the brain. Id.




149 See T.J. Ness, Models of Visceral Nociception, 40 ILAR J. 119 (1999), available
at http://www.dels.nas.edu/ilar/jour-online/40_3/40_3models.asp.
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"noxious stimulus" 5 ° inside an animal's body and watch to see if
the animal writhes in pain. 15 ' The "writhing test"'52 "consists of
injection [into the abdominal cavity] of a chemical irritant followed
by subsequent counting of 'writhes'-characteristic contraction of
abdominal muscles accompanied by a hind limb extensor
motion."'53 Experimenters have conducted "writhing tests" on rats,
mice, guinea pigs, dogs, cats, and primates-all of them anaesthe-
tized. "'54 Once the painful or irritating substance has been placed
inside the animal's body cavity, the scientists conducting the
experiment count how often the animal writhes in pain over a five-
minute period. 5 The experimenter records the number and
continues the five-minute tally over the course of either thirty or
sixty minutes.'5 6 A 0 to 3 scale measures the writhing, and the
highest score is given when the animal contracts his abdominal
muscles and then follows that contraction with stretching his body
and extending his back legs.' 57 One of the substances that may be
injected into the animal's abdominal cavity during the writhing
test is acetic acid, the pure form of the chemical which, in its much
more dilute state, gives vinegar its sour taste and smell.15 8 Acetic
acid makes up less than 10 percent of vinegar."' Undiluted, acetic
acid is corrosive and can burn the skin.6 0 The ILAR Journal article
mentions a "significant ethical concern" that this type of experi-
ment leaves the unanesthetized cat, ape, dog, rat, or other animal
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. Use of these painful tests continues to be implemented. See, e.g., A Role
of ASIC3 in the Modulation of High Intensity Pain Stimuli, PROC. OF THE NAT'L
ACAD. OF ScI. 8992 (2002), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/contentlabstractl
99/13/8992. One possible justification scientists might offer for this inhumane
treatment of animals is the testing of painkillers.





" Acetic Acid, Wikipeadia Encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acetic-
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writhing in pain for thirty or sixty minutes without any type of
analgesic. 6 '
Other experimenters cause pain by distending the colons and
rectums of unanesthetized, conscious rabbits and horses, using a
catheter to inflate a balloon placed in the animal's colon or
rectum.'6 2 Scientists surgically implant the balloon in the colon or
rectum permanently, so the rabbits and horses cannot rid them-
selves of it. 163 When the experimenter stretches a horse's colon or
rectum by inflating the balloon, the horse sweats, kicks, paws, and
moves its head." When the experimenter inflates the balloon in
the unanesthetized dog's colon, the dog lifts its head and changes
posture, stretches its back legs, and breathes faster or slower.'65
Experimenters may also distend the gall bladders of primates,
dogs, cats, and ferrets.'66 For other studies, scientists induce arti-
ficial kidney stones in rats.'67 The rats, like all animals described
in Ness's ILAR Journal article, are given no anesthetic or pain-
killer as they live with an artificial kidney stone for several days. 68
Over the course of the several days necessary for the rat to pass
the stone, it may have as many as sixty episodes in which it
writhes in pain-a period of writhing may last for up to forty-five
minutes. 169
In another test, experimenters will surgically insert a tube
into the urinary bladder of a rat.7 ° The next day, without adminis-
tering a painkiller, a preparation containing the solvent xylene
(which is used in paint thinners and gasoline) is dripped through
the tube into the rat's bladder.' 7 ' The rat immediately reacts by
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licking its abdomen and perineum, turning its head, stretching its
legs back, crying out, salivating, and defecating.'72
In a variation on the previous experiment, scientists introduce
a chemotherapy agent into the bladders of conscious rats, with no
analgesia, and rate their behavior.'73 "Beginning approximately 1
hour after systemic administration, and continuing for approxi-
mately 4 hours unanesthetized rats demonstrate alterations in
normal behavior [on this scale]: 1 = normal behavior; 2 =
lacrimation [shedding tears]; 3 = piloerection [goose bumps]; 4 =
rounded-back posture with alertness; 5 = rounded-back posture
with immobility; and 6 = transient 'crises' [no description of 'crises'
given]." Other irritants introduced into the bladders of conscious
animals include mustard oil and turpentine oil.
171
Other scientists cause animals to suffer by manipulating the
animals' sex organs. An experiment on a female rat consists of
scientists inserting a balloon into the rat's uterus and inflating it
until the pressure starves the uterine tissue of oxygen, a painful
phenomenon known as ischemia. 176 In an experiment on a male
rat, experimenters compress the rat's testicles. 77 Scientists also
squeeze the testicles of primates to cause pain. 178 Ness also notes
that stimulating the cervix of a female rat can produce "reproduc-
tive behaviors" such as arching her back and moving her tail to
permit penetration by the male, but that stimulating the cervix of
an anestrous female rat at "high intensities" produces "escape
behavior."179
Scientists attempt to induce in animals the pain of pancreati-
tis, a "model that utilizes a prolonged, inescapable stimulus to
mimic what is considered to be one of the most severe human
pains."18 0 At the conclusion of this list of methods, Ness warns that
172 Id. at 124.






179 Ness, supra note 149, at 125.
180Id. at 126.
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anesthesia has a negative effect on the usefulness of such tests
because it stops the pain."' "The effect of anesthesia on responses
to visceral stimuli has significant ethical ramifications since it
suggests that all studies [of visceral pain] should perhaps be
performed in unanesthetized animals."" 2
Another article, describing many of these same methods of
causing pain to animals, offers an additional approach: electrical
shock applied to the dental pulp of conscious, unanesthetized cats
and dogs." 3 Experimenters drill holes through a tooth and then
run an electrical wire through the cavity into the pulp of the tooth
delivering the electrical shock to the pulp of the unanesthetized cat
or dog."M
Martin Seligman also experimented on dogs by shocking them.
His lengthy career of experiments and publications on the topic
181 Ness also notes that this point raises an ethical issue. Id. at 120.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
183 See Daniel Le Bars et al., Animal Models of Nociception, 53 PHARMACO-
LOGICAL REV. 597 (2001). Experimenters also take unanesthetized dogs and
block the coronary arteries to deprive their hearts of blood, and cause a heart
attack. Ness, supra note 149, at 126.
4 The ancient Cartesian notion that animals cannot experience pain is
debunked by the very scientists who use animals as "models" of pain. In fact, the
Cartesian view of animal pain, that the screams of a dog-as each of his four
paws is nailed to a board so his veins can be cut open-are like the grindings of
metal in a broken machine, have been thoroughly and completely discredited by
science. Moreover, Descartes' view that animals are unable to feel pain has
never been mentioned in any reported court opinion except to describe the
demise of the notion.
Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian
view that animals are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere
property. The law should reflect society's recognition that
animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of
providing companionship to the humans with whom they live.
In doing so, courts should not hesitate to acknowledge that a
great number of people in this country today treat their pets as
family members.
Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. App. 1994). Discredited
Cartesian notions about animals must take their rightful place in our
discussions: they are relics.
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began in 1967 with Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock. 185
Seligman placed dogs in harnesses, rendering them completely
immobile, and then subjected some to uncontrollable, inescapable
electric shock at a level of six milliamperes. 8 6 The effect of this
level of electricity delivered to a female human is described as
causing "[p] ainful shock [and] loss of muscular control."8 7
A recent experiment using Seligman's concept of inescapable,
uncontrollable electric shock involved rendering rats immobile and
then delivering electrical shock to their tails over a one-hour
period.18 The rats received one shock per minute, with each shock
lasting five seconds.8 9 In addition, the experiment utilized another
method of inducing helplessness, anxiety, or despair. Rats were
dropped into water too deep for them to stand and denied any
method of escape or any ledge or corner on which to rest. 9 ° They
were left to flail for fifteen minutes until they gave up, thus
demonstrating behavioral despair, an "animal model of depres-
sion."1
91
Among the many disturbing aspects of these painful experi-
ments is the animal's inability to comprehend why he is experienc-
ing the pain, why he cannot stop the pain, and why no one will
help him. When a baboon, experimented on at Columbia Univer-
sity, wakes up in a cage, an eye missing and a metal clamp stuck
in the socket, he lies in the cage without painkillers until he dies,
never understanding what has happened or why, and perhaps
never losing hope that one of the humans in the laboratory will
realize he is suffering and come help him.
85 Martin Seligman, Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock, 74 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 1 (1967).
186 Id. at 1-9.
187 Controlling Electrical Hazards, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETYADMIN. 12,
available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3075.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
188 Karl J. Kaiyala et al., 5-HTb Receptor MRNA Levels in Dorsal Raphe
Nucleus: Inverse Association with Anxiety Behavior in the Elevated Plus Maze,
75 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAVIOR 769-76 (2003).
189 Id. at 770.
190.Id.
191 Id. at 769.
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The criminal law is instructive in this context. When society
judges a human's conduct to be so reprehensible that he or she
should be punished by death, certain standards of civil society
apply. For instance, society refuses to administer capital punish-
ment if a prisoner's mental incapacity renders the prisoner
incapable of understanding the punishment'9 2 and why he or she
has been singled out to suffer the punishment.'93 Society will not
drag a person from his or her cell, strap the person to a table, and
start the lethal drip if the person is incapable of understanding the
reason for the punishment. The Constitution and societal con-
science place constraints upon playing out such a Kafkaesque
scene with humans. Why allow the same to be done to animals?
At least two responses to this information are possible. One
proposes that such prisoners, although so reprehensible that they
have been sentenced to death, are nevertheless human and should
therefore never be compared to animals. The other imagines the
imagined questions that Isaac Bashevis Singer and Shylock might
ask if they knew of these experiments on conscious animals: Hath
not a dog senses, affections, passions, hurt with the same weapons,
subject to the same diseases, warmed and cooled as humans by the
same winter and summer? If you keep him alone in a cage for
years, is he not lonely? If you torture him, does he not suffer?'94
In the final analysis, laws must be measured by what they
promise and provide. Current laws permit scientists to deliberately
cause pain in dogs, cats, primates, rats, guinea pigs, horses, and
other animals without providing painkillers. Scientists cause this
pain by inflating surgically implanted balloons to distend the
animals' colons and rectums, burning them, or squeezing their
testicles, and then watch as the powerless animals writhe in
pain. 95 If all this can be done under the auspices of a statute
entitled the "Animal Welfare Act," what might scientists do under
the governance of a provision entitled the "Neutrality to Animals
192 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,410 (1986); Smith v. Armontrout,
857 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1988).
193 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,333 (1989); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399,422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
114 See supra notes 43-45.
195 See supra notes 162-79.
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Law?" If injecting corrosive acid into the body cavity of an
unanesthetized dog and watching him writhe in pain for an hour
is welfare, then for what wrongs does our law reserve the word
"cruelty?"
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Early Common Law Approach, in which Animals Were
Treated as Property
At early common law, animals had no rights and were treated
exclusively as property.'96 They had no inherent value, and the
only harm to animals with which the law was concerned was the
harm that could reduce the animal's value to its human owner. 1
97
As long as the prohibition against diminishing an animal's value
was honored, an owner could torment the animal in any way he
or she pleased. 9 ' This model of animals as chattel, to be dealt
with as the owner saw fit, failed to recognize that animals can and
do suffer pain. As the recognition of animals as sentient beings
became more commonplace, recognition of their rights followed
close behind.
B. The Recognition of the Rights of Animals in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries
In contrast to the state of affairs under early common law,
courts and legal scholars in the United States began to recognize
substantive rights for animals as early as the nineteenth cen-
tury.'99 Thus, animals are no strangers to U.S. courts, nor is the
vindication of their rights a novel concept. In 1897, the Louisiana
196 See, e.g., State v. Karstendiek, et al., 22 So. 845 (La. 1897).
'97See Elaine L. Hughes & Christine Meyer, Animal Welfare Law in Canada and
Europe, 6 ANIMAL L. 23, 25 (2000) (citing Jerrold Tannenbaum, Animals and
the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 SOCIAL RESEARCH 539 (1995)).
198 Id.
199 See infra notes 200-05. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of
Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (2003).
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Supreme Court heard the appeal of two men convicted of cruelty
to animals. 20 ' Rejecting the appellants' argument that a statute
prohibiting cruelty to animals interfered with their property rights
in the animals they owned, the court held that
[tihe statute relating to animals is based on "the
theory, unknown to the common law, that animals
have rights, which, like those of human beings, are to
be protected. A horse, under its master's hands,
stands in a relation to the master analogous to that
of a child to a parent." Reasoning from that basis, we
feel certain that the ordinance and the statute do not
interfere with the private right of property as
claimed.201
That decision was no fluke of Louisiana civil law. The
following year, although reversing a cruelty conviction for failure
to show the requisite proof of intent, the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of such statutes was to remedy the
common law's failure to recognize the rights of animals.2 2 The
court further explained that
[t]o disregard the rights and feelings of equals is
unjust and ungenerous, but to willfully or wantonly
injure or oppress the weak and helpless is mean and
cowardly. Human beings have at least some means of
protecting themselves . . . but dumb brutes have
none. Cruelty to them manifests a vicious and de-
graded nature, and it tends inevitably to cruelty to
men. Animals whose lives are devoted to our use and
pleasure, and which are capable, perhaps, of feeling
as great physical pain or pleasure as ourselves,
deserve for these considerations alone, kindly treat-
ment.20 3
200 Karstendiek, 22 So. at 845.
201 Id. at 847 (citation omitted).
202 Stephens v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1887).
203 Id. at 459.
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Similarly, a Texas appellate court, upholding a conviction for
killing a dog, recognized without hesitation that animals have
rights.°4 The court stated that "[I esides, the dog has rights, which
it seems to us should not be jeopardized on slight provocation."2 5
More recently, Professor Sunstein has written that federal
statutes, especially AWA, provide an "incipient bill of rights for
animals."2 6 As discussed herein, however, such rights mean little,
and could, in fact, conceal the abuse the laws were intended to
stop, unless the animals have standing to enforce those rights.
Until courts uniformly recognize animal standing, the industries
that claim to be regulated by HMSA and AWA will ignore or waive
the dictates of those laws, placating the public by pointing to the
very laws the industries ignore and waive.
C. HMSA and AWA Do More Harm Than Good
For at least two reasons, animals would fare better if HMSA
and AWA had never been passed. First, one of the laws has been
held to preempt state anti-cruelty statutes.2 7 Second, the enact-
ment of these two statutes quelled the public outcry that arose
when the routine torture committed in slaughterhouses and
research laboratories came to light.20 8 The government, along with
the biomedical research and slaughter industries, passed these
laws to pacify a populace that refused to stand by while animals
were tortured. Ironically, the public's dire concern about the
treatment of animals has been quieted even as the torture
continues, because the public believed the most basic promise of
our government: that a law is something to be obeyed and
enforced.
204 Brookreson v. State, 93 S.W. 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906).
205Id.
2
. Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for Animals (with
Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Tribute].
207 See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 215-20 and accompanying text.
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At least one court has been willing to protect lawbreakers from
prosecution under state anti-cruelty statutes by ruling that these
illusory federal laws preempt state cruelty statutes. 20 9 Though
neither the word "preemption" nor the concept of preemption
appears in AWA, a Maryland appellate court used the doctrine to
reverse and render a trial court's conviction of Edward Taub on
charges of cruelty to animals.210 Taub conducted medical experi-
ments on monkeys and when Maryland authorities raided his
laboratory, they found seventeen monkeys, "each in a small cage
that hadn't been cleaned for days."2 1' Worse still, "[sleveral of the
monkeys had bitten off fingers, and some had chewed into their
limbs, leaving raw, open wounds the size of silver dollars, wounds
that were covered with filthy bandages or not covered at all."21 2
Although Taub was convicted of multiple counts of cruelty, the
Maryland Court of Appeals vacated his conviction because of the
existence of AWA,213 ignoring the fact that AWA contains no
provisions for the criminal prosecution of a person who tortures
animals in a research laboratory. 2 4 The Maryland court appar-
ently believed that a person performing experiments on animals
can do anything to animals with impunity.
No case has gone to the Maryland court to test how far this
immunity goes. Can a researcher crucify unanesthetized chimpan-
zees and leave them on their crosses for days until they die of
thirst to test endurance? Can a researcher flay a conscious, feeling
dog alive, a square inch of skin a day, to determine how long he
will live? Or can he leave a rat in a tiny walled cage for weeks to
see how long it takes the animal to suffocate on his own accumu-
lating feces? These examples are not to be scoffed at, with a
respected state appellate court having implied that those who
experiment on animals enjoy absolute immunity from laws
prohibiting cruelty to animals.
209 Taub v. State, 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983).
210Id.
211 Peter Carlson, The Great Silver Spring Monkey Debate, WASH. POST MAG.,
Feb. 24, 1991, at W15.
212 id.
213 Taub, 463 A.2d at 821-22.
214 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131-2159 (2002).
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Not only do the statutes allegedly preempt, they also placate
the public. One example of this effect is this question and following
answer from the Foundation for Biomedical Research 15 ("FBR")
web site:
[Question:] Aren't the animals in laboratories suffer-
ing and in pain?
[Answer:] The use of animals in research and testing
is strictly controlled, particularly regarding potential
pain. Federal laws, the Animal Welfare Act and the
Public Health Service Act, [216] regulate the allevia-
tion and elimination of pain, as well as such aspects
of animal care as caging, feeding, exercise of dogs and
the psychological well-being of primates. Further,
each institution must establish an animal care and
use committee that includes an outside member of
the public as well as a veterinarian. This committee
oversees, inspects and monitors every potential
experiment to help ensure optimal animal care. The
scientific community advocates the highest quality of
animal care and treatment for two key reasons. First,
the use of animals in research is a privilege, and
those animals that are helping us unlock the myster-
ies of disease deserve our respect and the best possi-
ble care. Second, a well-treated animal will provide
more reliable scientific results, which is the goal of
all researchers.2 17
215 The Foundation for Biomedical Research is a public relations arm of the
biomedical research industry, which is organized to persuade the public that
biomedical research is necessary and humane. See About the Foundation for
Biomedical Research, Foundation for Biomedical Research, at http://www.fb
research.orglabout/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
216 The Public Health Service Act provides for the Director of the National
Institutes of Health, in funding research, to enforce rules similar to the
provisions of AWA. See 42 U.S.C. § 283(e) (2002).
217 Frequently Asked Questions About Animal Research, Foundation for
Biomedical Research, at http://www.fbresearch.org/animal-research-faq.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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FBR's description of experiments on animals as "strictly
controlled, particularly regarding potential pain" is breathtaking,
given that AWA expressly and specifically prohibits the Secretary
of Agriculture from promulgating research-related rules if those
rules touch upon the "requiremen [t]" for consulting a veterinarian
in designing painful procedures, or touch upon the "requiremen [t]"
for using tranquilizers, analgesics and anesthetics in painful
research.218 It is stunning for FBR to claim that experiments on
animals are "strictly controlled," given the sieve-like law which
allows the scientists allegedly being regulated to waive any and all
regulations, including those about painful experiments, by placing
a statement of explanation in the file and annual report to
USDA.219 Thus, AWA, which is largely illusory, is a useful tool for
the public relations arm of the biomedical research industry,
allowing the industry to claim there are "strict controls" on
experiments when there are in fact no such controls in the statute.
Just as FBR points to AWA provisions to eliminate citizens'
concerns that animals are suffering in medical research laborato-
ries, meatpacking industry group American Meat Institute ("AMI")
uses HMSA to assure the public that animals are treated well. The
AMI includes the following information regarding animal welfare
in a press kit available on its web site:
The U.S. meat industry is one of the most heavily
regulated industries in the nation .... The Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978 dictates strict
animal handling and slaughtering practices for
packing plants.... Key requirements under the Act
specify ... that livestock must be rendered insensible
to pain prior to slaughter. The Act details the meth-
ods that must be used to stun animals.
218 7 U.S.C. § 2143(6)(ii) (2002).
219 Id. § 2143(3).
220 Overview: Animal Welfare in Packing Plants, American Meat Institute, 1
(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.meatami.com/content/presscenter/factsheets
_Infokits/OverviewAnimalWelfareinPackingPlants.pdf.
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What is worse, there are other, entirely unregulated areas of
human conduct and commerce in which animals are subjected to
systematic torture. One is the factory farm, where intensive
confinement methods condemn animals to lives of unrelenting
anguish. For example, U.S. poultry farmers continue to use battery
cages, crowding so many chickens into one cage that birds cannot
stretch their wings or move freely.22' The lives of cage-raised
chickens are miserable, and their deaths can be worse. Workers
at one U.S. poultry slaughter plant were caught on videotape
torturing living, conscious birds for sport by ripping off their
beaks, spitting tobacco juice into their mouths and eyes, and
squeezing the birds so hard that they expelled feces. 222 A long
history of regulatory efforts regarding humane treatment has
ended where it began - in failure. It is clear that other, more
powerful methods for ending the torture of animals must come to
the forefront.
D. The Fair and Just Use of the Judicial Doctrine of Standing
Efforts to protect animals have failed. The common law offered
them no protection. State statutes promising to punish cruelty are
rarely enforced and sometimes held to be preempted by federal
law.2 23 Federal laws offering minimal protections are riddled with
exclusions, routinely ignored, and in the case of AWA, rendered
almost useless because the power to regulate is in the hands of the
regulated.224 The last ray of hope for these tormented creatures is
the principled application of the legal doctrine of standing. If the
promise of this doctrine is to hold true, courts must follow their
own standards. Judicial rules of standing apply whether the
plaintiff is rich or poor, two-legged or four-legged. If "[t]he hum-
blest citizen in all the land, when clad in the armor of a righteous
221 Michael Pollan, An Animal's Place, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at Sect. 6.
2 2 2 Associated Press, KFC Supplier Fires 11 After Video of Chicken Abuse (July
21, 2004), available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2004-
07-21-kfc-supplierx.htm.
223 See supra Part III.C.
224 See supra Part II.B.
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cause, is stronger than all the hosts of error," 225 then surely courts
clothed with the power and dignity of the Nation and her states
can face down powerful industries and order them to stop torturing
helpless animals for profit.
One appropriate means to stop the torture of animals, not only
in slaughterhouses and research laboratories but in other settings
as well, already exists. That method is a legal action brought by
the animal's guardian or next friend to vindicate the animal's
interests and rights. Despite courts' recognition of the standing of
animals for more than thirty years,226 court decisions holding that
animals have or lack standing contain no hint of the rationale
relied upon to reach such conclusions. The cases are hopelessly
inconsistent; they rarely mention, much less apply, the established
rules of standing.22 7 Developing a sound, principled basis for
deciding such cases must begin with an analysis of the rather
amorphous concept of standing. When courts employ the rules of
standing, rather than severing the word from its meaning, not only
can the failures of HMSA and AWA largely be remedied, but
animals falling outside the purview of federal legislation may have
a chance to avoid the factory farm and the wood chipper.
IV. DANGEROUS TERRAIN: THE LAW OF STANDING
Standing is a terrain in which a traveler can become lost,
unless he begins his journey by looking out over the vista and
locating several landmarks that will serve as reference points
during the exploration. Certain distinctions serve as those
landmarks. First, there is the distinction between standing and
other rules of justiciability. Standing is one of several concepts
used to determine whether a given case is justiciable, i.e., whether
a court action is the proper vehicle for resolving the matter. Other
225 William Jennings Bryan, The Cross of Gold: Speech delivered before the
National Democratic Convention at Chicago 17 (July 9, 1896) (Univ. of Nebraska
Press, 1996).
226 See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
227 See infra Part IV.C.
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justiciability doctrines include mootness, 2 ' ripeness,229 political
question,21 and advisory opinion.231 Any claimant, in order to be
heard, must leap all of the justiciability hurdles applicable to her
case, including standing. The line between standing and the other
justiciability doctrines is not always a bright one.
Second, there is the distinction between federal courts and
state courts. Most decisions involving standing are federal court
decisions because, like the federal courts themselves, constitu-
tional standing is a creature of Article III of the Constitution.232
Although state courts may have their own state constitutional,
statutory, and common law limitations specifying who may bring
suit, state courts are not bound by the rules of standing arising
from the Constitution, because they owe neither their existence nor
their jurisdiction to Article III.
Third is the distinction between constitutional standing and
prudential standing. Article III standing, also known as constitu-
tional standing, is not the only doctrine of standing applied by
federal courts. A claimant who meets the requirements of constitu-
tional standing may nevertheless find the path barred by judge-
made law regarding prudential standing. Constitutional standing
and prudential standing are two different standards against which
a claimant's case is measured, and prudential standing is the more
exacting of the two. Prudential standing is also the only standing
that can be waived, by the court or the legislature.233
228 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
229 Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n. v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) (holding
that concessionaires' objections to administrative regulations relating to national
parks' business relationships with concessionaires were not ripe for judicial
determination, where those objections constituted general objections to the
regulations, rather than a specific, well-defined dispute).23 0 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (deciding that impeached federal
judge's challenge to Senate's rules for conducting impeachment was
nonjusticiable political question). The prohibition against considering political
questions arises not only with regard to constitutional standing, but also with
regard to prudential standing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1990).
231 United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (declining to interpret a
federal statute where there had been no "adversary argument exploring every
aspect of' the matter).
232 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564, 567 (2004).
233 See infra part IV.B.
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Fourth, there is the distinction between statutory claims and
common law claims. Although most standing litigation involves a
case brought pursuant to statute, a party who brings a common
law claim must also establish that he or she has standing.234 A
grasp of these basic distinctions is important to understanding the
following, more detailed analysis of the law of standing.
A. Constitutional Standing
Federal courts in the United States have the power to issue
rulings only in the context of an actual dispute between identified
parties.235 This limitation on the courts' authority to decide cases
arises from the explicit language of Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that courts may act only where there is a "case or
controversy."
23 6
211 See Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,831 (1999) (deciding whether class
member with "exposure-only" claims in mass tort has suffered injury-in-fact);
Eastland Partners Ltd. Partners v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 620 (6th Cir.
2003) (deciding that a partnership had standing to assert a breach of contract
claim because it had suffered an injury-in-fact).
235 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)
(deciding that considerations of prudential standing preclude courts from
considering a claim by a party whose standing depends on issues of family law
that are in dispute); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93
(2003) (holding that a U.S. Senator who planned to run ads critical of his
opponent in the future, and who had done so in the past, demonstrated no
injury-in-fact and thus had no standing to challenge federal statute limiting the
availability of political contributions that could be used to pay for such ads);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (holding that parents of black children in
public schools did not have standing to sue Internal Revenue Service for
inadequately enforcing the prohibition against tax-exempt status for private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race); Fed. Communications Comm'n
v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943) (holding that one aggrieved by a decision
of the FCC has standing to bring an action against the FCC).
236 The constitutional provision referred to in the phrase "case or controversy"
reads as follows:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
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This limitation on the power of the courts is known as
standing.2"7 Although constitutional standing is a limitation on
the jurisdiction of the court, it is almost always expressed as a
failing in the plaintiffs case, so that the reason given for dismiss-
ing the case is not the court's lack ofjurisdiction, but the plaintiffs
lack of standing.23 Article III creates no rights, because standing
is not a constitutional right. Standing is the effect, from the
claimant's perspective, of Article III's definition of the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. The fact that Article III creates no rights is
momentous in cases involving animals. A court recognizing the
standing of an animal is not creating a new right; it is merely
deciding to decide whether the animal has rights that have been
violated.
In determining whether a claimant has standing, courts use
certain settled legal principles. To establish239 standing to sue,
a claimant must meet three requirements, referred to as the
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State-between Citizens of different States-between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST., art. III.
2317 An early use of the term "standing" in federal courts appeared in Brent v.
Bank of Washington, which stated that if a party could assert only a legal claim,
then he would have "no standing in equity." 35 U.S. 596, 613 (1836).
23 See, e.g., McConnell 540 U.S. at 93; Selective Service Sys. v. Midwest Pub. Int.
Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984); Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.D.C. 1999).
239 The party invoking the court's jurisdiction has not only the burden of going
forward but also the burden of persuasion (sometimes referred to as the risk of
non-persuasion) with regard to each of the three elements. Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000). The quantum and type of proof
that must be brought forward by the party invoking the court's jurisdiction
depends on the stage of the proceedings at which standing is challenged or
otherwise reviewed. The proof that will suffice for the claimant to survive a
motion to dismiss is less than the proof that will suffice for opposing a motion for
summaryjudgment on the issue of standing. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
167-68 (1997); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
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"irreducible constitutional minimum"24° needed to invoke the
power of the federal courts. First, the claimant must show that she
has suffered an injury-in-fact. Such an injury-in-fact must be
"actual or imminent," "concrete," and "distinct and palpable."24'
Next, the claimant must establish causation, i.e., she must show
that the defendant's conduct of which she complains led to her
injury. Put another way, she must show that her injury is "fairly
traceable" to the defendant's conduct. 242 Third, she must demon-
strate redressibility; that is, she must show that a ruling in her
favor will likely provide her with relief from the injury of which
she complains.2 43 A conscious cow on her way to the belly-ripper
can satisfy this three-part standard.
B. Prudential Standing
Standing which emanates from Article III's "case or contro-
versy" requirement is jurisdictional, so that in its absence, the
court has no power to hear the matter. The closely related doctrine
of prudential standing is a means whereby the federal courts
impose their own limitations on the cases they will consider,
declining to hear cases they have the power to hear where it would
be unwise, as a matter of policy, to do so.24 Because prudential
standing does not arise from the Constitution, Congress has the
power to eliminate the federal judiciary's self-imposed limits and
require that the actions arising from the statute at issue be heard
by the courts, so long as the constitutional minimum is met.245
Prudential standing consists of three major principles. First,
when the claimant brings suit pursuant to a statute, prudential
considerations regarding standing-if not eliminated by Con-
gress-may require that the claimant be "within the zone of
240 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225 (quoting Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)).
241 Id. at 225 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
242 Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329
(1999); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1990).243 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225-26.
244 Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank et al., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
245 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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interests" the statute was intended to protect.246 If the claimant is
not, he lacks standing, and his claim may be dismissed. Second,
the plaintiff must not be allowed to use the courts to seek relief
from a generalized grievance he shares with the populace at
large.247 Third, a plaintiff may not seek to vindicate an injury to a
third party.24 Of course, and of great importance with regard to
animals, the prohibition against suchjus tertii standing does not
preclude a guardian or next friend from bringing an action on
behalf of another, so long as an adequate reason is offered for the
real party's inability to proceed and the guardian or "'next friend'
[is] truly dedicated to the best interests of the" one she
represents.249
Just as courts can use the judge-made doctrine of prudential
standing to raise the bar and contract the class of claimants with
standing, Congress can include in a statute a private suit
provision 25° that eliminates considerations of prudential standing
and lowers the bar to the irreducible constitutional minimum.2
Although standing is a doctrine much-criticized for vagueness
and inconsistency," 2 its rough contours are certainly recognizable.
A claimant may not bring suit unless he can demonstrate the
irreducible constitutional minimum of injury-in-fact, causation,
246 Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7 (2002).
247Id.
248Id.
249 Vhitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990); see also Elk Grove Unified
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that considerations of pru-
dential standing preclude divorced father from asserting his daughter's right not
to be required to participate in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, when
the father's interests and the daughter's may be in conflict).
250 Such actions are sometimes referred to as "citizen suits." See, e.g. S. Florida.
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosuhee, 541 U.S. 95, 99 (2004). The term is a misnomer,
however, because a claimant need not be a citizen in order to bring such a suit.
O'Rourke v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 684 F. Supp. 716 (D.D.C. 1988) (involving an
alien bringing suit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")).
Therefore, they are referred to, in this Article, as "private suits."
211 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1997).
252 See, e.g., Mark Bobrowski, The Zoning Act's "Person Aggrieved" Standard:
From Barvenin to Marashian, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 385 (1996).
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and redressibility. Even if he can make such a showing, the court
may nevertheless refuse him entry by relying on principles of
prudential standing.
Congress, by statute, can eliminate prudential standing and
thus preclude the courts from using the doctrine of prudential
standing when considering actions based on a specific statute. The
court can choose to waive prudential standing in a particular case.
Although this is a very spare statement of a subtly nuanced
doctrine, it serves to demonstrate that there is at least an identifi-
able jurisprudence of standing, such that there is no need or
justification for inconsistent, ipse dixit 53 rulings regarding the
standing of animals.
C. Severing the Word from Its Meaning in Cases Involving
Animals
Court decisions relating to the standing of animals254 are
wildly inconsistent and lacking in articulated rationale. Instead
of applying the rules of standing to the claims brought by animals
and their guardians, courts simply issue unexplained rulings to
the effect that the animals have or lack standing. They treat
standing not as a rule of law to be used in a principled way, but
instead as a shibboleth. 5
253 "[I] pse dixit" literally means "he himself said it." The phrase is used to refer
to "[s]omething asserted but not proved." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 828 (6th ed.
1990).
254 This Article addresses solely the question of the standing of animals.
255 A shibboleth is a password of sorts, used by Old Testament warriors to
identify the enemy:
And the Gileadites took the passages of Jordan before the
Ephraimites: and it was so, that when those Ephraimites which
were escaped said, Let me go over; that the men of Gilead said
unto him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If he said, Nay;... Then said
they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he
could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and
slew him at the passages of Jordan....
Judges 12:5-7.
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Transforming the jurisprudence of animal standing from
shibboleth into rationale begins with a review of U.S. cases
involving animals as parties. Because no meaningful rationale or
framework for these disparate decisions exists, they are presented
here in two general groupings: Cases granting standing to animals
without an explanation and cases denying animals standing
without an explanation. Reflecting poorly on the U.S. judiciary,
the unifying feature of these several cases is the absence of any
principled application of rules regarding injury-in-fact, redres-
sibility, causation, or prudential standing.256
What must have seemed at the time to be the foundational
animal rights decision came in 1974, when Helen E. Jones came
into court "as next friend and guardian for all livestock animals
now and hereafter awaiting slaughter in the United States."257
Jones and other animal advocates sued the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, seeking relief on the animals' behalf from the provisions of
HMSA that allow ritual slaughter.5 The plaintiffs claimed that
traditional ritual slaughter was cruel and that allowing it as an
exception to HMSA violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." 9
After considering "standing [which was] vigorously contested
in the briefs and upon the argument,"26 ° the court concluded that
the Secretary of Agriculture's assertion that the plaintiffs lacked
standing "present[ed] no serious obstacle to a consideration of
the merits."261 Reviewing established precedent regarding such
concepts as injury to conservational interests and injury to moral
principles, the Court, although ultimately ruling against the
plaintiffs on the merits, concluded without hesitation that they had
256 See infra Part TV.C.
257 Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
258 Id. at 1285-86.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 1287.
261 Id. at 1287-88. But see Int'l Primate Prot. League et al. v. Inst. for Behavioral
Res., Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying human plaintiffs' assertion of
their own financial and aesthetic standing, but failing to address whether the
animals themselves had experienced a redressible injury-in-fact caused by the
defendants' conduct).
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standing.262 Not only did the district court hear the claims of
"Helen Jones as next friend and guardian for all livestock animals
now and hereafter awaiting slaughter in the U.S.," but indeed the
U.S. Supreme Court, without opinion, affirmed the ruling of the
district court.263 More than ten years later, in a case that did not
involved animals, the U.S. Court of International Trade relied on
Jones in rejecting a challenge to standing.2 4
The Jones court necessarily recognized the standing of the
animals awaiting slaughter when it allowed Helen Jones to
proceed as their guardian and next friend. The court failed,
however, to provide a thorough explanation for the decision or to
address explicitly any constitutional or prudential standing
requirements.265 It is possible that the court failed to expressly
address the standing of the animals because their standing was so
obvious.266 Of course animals in the slaughterhouses were suffering
appalling torture caused by the inactions, of the Secretary of
Agriculture, just as they are today, and of course a victory against
him would have redressed that suffering, to some extent.
262 Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1289.
263 Jones v. Butz, 419 U.S. 806 (1974). The decision was not a denial of a petition
for writ of certiorari; it was an affirmance, without opinion, of the lower court's
decision. Id.
264 Suffice it to note for now that in Jones v. Butz, a case
challenging the act of August 27, 1958 to establish federal policy
as to the use of humane methods of slaughter of livestock, the
courts sustained the standing of the plaintiffs, apparently
including that of the first named as "the next friend and
guardian for all livestock animals now and hereafter awaiting
slaughter in the United States."
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085, 1093 (1995) (citations
omitted).
265 See Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1287-89.
266 Professor Craig has addressed the separation of powers issues arising from
citizen suits brought to protect the environment. See Robin Kundis Craig, Will
Separation of Powers Challenges "Take Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits?
Article II, Injury-In-Fact, Private "Enforcers," and Lessons from Qui Tam
Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (2001). In a system that recognizes the
standing of animals, separation of powers issues would seldom arise, because the
animals suffer injury and can establish constitutional standing.
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The conclusion that animals have standing, coupled with the
lack of explanation for that conclusion, continued in three cases
decided after Jones. The next case involved the Palila26 7 (Loxioides
Bailleui), a small, light-breasted bird with a yellow head and blue
wings, found only on the big island of Hawaii.26 Lawyers for the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund brought suit on the Palila's behalf
in 1988 because the Palila is an endangered species. The Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources allowed sheep to live
on the Palila's only habitat, thus endangering that habitat. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii ordered removal of
the sheep.269 In affirming that decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held
[a] s an endangered speciesunder the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. .. , the bird. . ., a member of the Hawaiian
honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings
its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own
right. The Palila... has earned the right to be capi-
talized since it is a party to this proceeding . ,,270
In fact, the first time the Ninth Circuit reviewed the much-
litigated matter, it did not even mention the other plaintiffs (the
Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and Alan Ziegler) and
instead simply discussed the party interested, directly and
tangibly, in the outcome: "In 1978 the Sierra Club and others
brought an action under the [Endangered Species] Act on behalf of
the Palila .... ." Although it recognized the Palila's standing, the
court conducted no examination of the facts pursuant to the
irreducible constitutional minimum, nor any analysis as to
whether the Palila met that standard. If the court had applied the
three-part test, the court likely would have focused on the possible
26 7 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Nat. Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986).
268 See Threatened and Endangered Animals in the Hawaiian Islands: Palila,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, at http://www.fws.gov/pacificislands/wesa/palila.
htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).2 69 Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1071.
270 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir.
1988) (citation omitted).
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extinction of a species and death of an individual bird. Both
extinction and death are injuries caused by the defendants' act in
allowing sheep to live on the Palila's habitat and eat its only food,
and requiring the defendants to relocate those sheep would redress
the Palila's injuries. Therefore, if the court had applied the three-
part test to the facts in this case, the outcome would have been the
same: the Palila has standing.
The next animal whose standing was recognized without any
explanation was the Northern Spotted Owl. 271 In 1988, the
Northern Spotted Owl brought an action asserting that the
Secretary of the Interior's failure to list it as a threatened species
was arbitrary and capricious, and the Secretary should be required
to reconsider the determination, and, if he persisted in the non-
listing, give reasons therefore.2 7 2 The Owl prevailed.273 Encouraged
by the result, the Owl's representatives sued again in 1991 to
require the Secretary to designate and thereby protect its critical
habitat.274 In both cases, the lawyers' assertions on behalf of
the Northern Spotted Owl were sufficient to allege standing. 5
The Owl suffered injury because of the Secretary's failure to list
it as threatened, and later because of the Secretary's failure to
designate its critical habitat. These injuries were redressed by
successful court action which granted the Northern Spotted Owl
standing.
In 1990, an enigmatic decision hinting at rationale came
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The puzz-
ling decision involving the Mount Graham Red Squirrel did not
fall neatly into either category described above; it was neither an
unexplained decision that an animal has standing, nor an unex-
plained decision that an animal lacks standing.2 76 Although
plaintiff environmental groups were found to have standing,
and the university seeking to build an observatory on the Red
271 Northern Spotted Owl et al. v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
272 Id. at 479-83.
273 Id. at 483.
274 Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
275 Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 483; Lujan, 758 F. Supp. at 629-30.
276 Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Squirrel's habitat ultimately prevailed,277 the following footnote
appeared in the opinion: "No party has mentioned and, notwith-
standing our normal rules, we do not consider, the standing of the
first-named party to bring this action."278 Concluding this footnote,
the court referenced Justice Douglas's famous dissent in which he
argued that the mountains and the rivers themselves have
standing.7 9 Denying that it considered the squirrel's standing, the
Ninth Circuit then remanded the case, reasoning that "the Red
Squirrel's chances for a fair hearing may have been considerably
reduced" by the prestige of the university seeking to build the
"observatory and [by] other parochial interests."28 ° The court, in
confusing language, implied a significant rule about the standing
of animals: when a decision affects an animal protected by law,
that animal deserves a fair hearing.
The court granted standing to another endangered animal, the
Marbled Murrulet, though still without any analysis of whether
the animal established the irreducible constitutional minimum of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility, along with any
applicable requirements of prudential standing.2"' Given the lack
of explanation in the opinions, an observer could conclude that
these rulings depended on reading tea leaves rather than law. The
Marbled Murrulet, a small seabird, brought suit along with others
against a lumber company to prohibit the taking of the Marbled
Murrelet's habitat.28 2 In granting the injunctive relief, the court
held that "as a protected species under the ESA, the marbled
murrelet has standing to sue 'in its own rights."'
28 3
As described above, these rulings were issued in favor of
animals whose guardians or lawyers asserted the animals had
277 Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 786 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1992).
27 8 Id. at 1448, n.13.
2179 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-52 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).2 80 Madigan, 954 F.2d at 1463.
28 Marbled Murrelet, Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp.
1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995).282 Id.
283 Id. at 1346 (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Nat. Res., 649 F. Supp.
1070, 1107 (D. Haw. 1986).
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standing. Although recognizing the animals' standing, the courts
did not articulate the reasons for their decisions, thus leaving
the law regarding the standing of animals sufficiently unclear
so as to allow room for equally unexplained decisions reaching
the opposite result. The first such case, decided in 1991, involved
a Hawaiian crow species known as the 'Alala.2 84 The district
court denied the 'Alala standing, relying not on the principles of
constitutional and prudential standing, but on an erroneous
interpretation of the private suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA). 2"5 The court made no reference to the irreduc-
ible constitutional minimum and this omission was essential to
its ruling; if the court had reviewed questions of injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressibility, it would have necessarily reached
the opposite conclusion. At the time of the legal proceedings, the
'Alala had seen its numbers diminish to the point that only twenty-
one birds existed anywhere on Earth.286 Eleven of those were in
a captive breeding program.28 7 Of the ten living in the wild, it
was believed that nine lived on land owned by the defendants, the
McCandless. 288 EPA crafted a plan to save the 'Alala.2 9 The
McCandless defendants, however, refused to allow environmental
officials on their property to take actions necessary to the plan.29 °
In the face of the defendants' objections, the government did not
pursue legal action to require the defendants to allow access to
their property.29 ' The 'Alala and others sued to require the
government to take legal action and proceed with the plan to save
the 'Alala from extinction.292 Extinction of the species or death of
a bird contributing to extinction is an injury-in-fact. Death and
284 Hawaiian Crow ('Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991).
285 See infra notes 294-95.





291 Id.29' Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 551.
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extinction are distinct and palpable injuries.293 With only twenty-
one birds remaining on the face of the Earth, extinction was
imminent. The cause of the impending death of individual birds
and the cause of extinction were wrongs of the government's failing
to pursue entry onto the defendants' land and the refusal of the
defendants to allow the government onto the land where nine of
the remaining twenty-one birds were believed to live, in order to
carry out the plan to save the bird from extinction. A court decision
in favor of the 'Alala would have redressed the wrongs, effectuated
the plan to save the birds, and saved the 'Alala from death and
extinction. That the irreducible constitutional minimum existed is
beyond peradventure.294 The court did not analyze the case under
established rules of standing, and instead relied on an erroneous
interpretation of ESA. The court interpreted the private suit
provision of ESA and, in particular, the term "person," as contract-
ing rather than expanding the class of plaintiffs who have standing
to sue pursuant to ESA.295
The 'Alala's constitutional standing, particularly with regard
to imminent harm, is seen more starkly in hindsight. Because of
the erroneous ruling denying the 'Alala standing, the number of
them alive in the wild has diminished precipitously. At the time of
the court's decision, there were ten 'Alala left in the wild on earth.
Now, the 'Alala is extinct in the wild.296
Despite its failure to analyze the facts of the case pursuant to
the three-part test of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility,
the Hawaiian Crow court's ruling influenced the decision in
293 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003); Vermont
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000);
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
294 Concerns about prudential standing Were not at issue, as described in the text
following notes 214.
295 Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 551-53.
296 See Draft Revised Recovery Plan for the Alala (corvus hawaiiensis), U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv. (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/
EPA-SPECIES/2003/December/Day-22/e31467.htm; Email from Barbara A.
Maxfield, External Affairs Chief, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, to Elizabeth
DeCoux, Visiting Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (Apr. 13, 2005)
(on file with author).
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Citizens to EndAnimal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England
Aquarium.29 7 The case involved an aquarium's desire to rid itself
of a dolphin named Kama that "did not fit into the social climate
at the Aquarium."29" The Aquarium gave Kama to the Navy for use
in SONAR tests. Relying on Hawaiian Crow and its misplaced
reference to the private suit provision of ESA, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that Kama
lacked standing to challenge the Aquarium's decision to deliver it
to the Navy for testing.2 99 The court did not provide sufficient
information in its opinion about the environment at the New
England Aquarium or the Navy test site, nor sufficient information
about Kama's life at either place, to allow after-the-fact consider-
ation of whether moving Kama constituted an injury-in-fact. °° A
guardian ad litem, dedicated to the interests of Kama, could have
solved this issue and provided the necessary information, likely
leading to the conclusion that Kama had standing.30 '
The next unexplained decision came in a case involving the
Loggerhead Turtle.3 2 The Loggerhead and the Green Turtle, along
with two humans, sued the County Council of Volusia County,
Florida, seeking an injunction banning private vehicles from the
beach, because light from the vehicles affected the turtles' ability
to find the ocean.30 3 In issuing the injunction, the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida held that a "species
protected under the ESA has standing to sue 'in its own right' to
297 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
298 Id. at 46.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 45-59.
301 This reference to the need for a guardian ad litem does not reflect negatively
on the desire and ability of C.E.A.S.E., the Animal Legal Defense Fund, and the
Progressive Animal Welfare Society to advocate for Kama's best interests;
however, because no guardian ad litem was appointed and the court did not
provide sufficient information about the two settings in its opinion, after-the-fact
analysis of constitutional standing cannot be undertaken with any degree of
success in this case.
302 Loggerhead Turtle, et al. v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 896
F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
301 Id. at 1172.
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enforce the provisions of the Act."30 4 Indeed, grizzly bears joined
a mountain range in an effort to stop mineral exploration in
northwest Montana. °5 Although the court ultimately ruled against
the wilderness and the grizzlies, it did not expressly and specifi-
cally deny their standing.0 6
In 2003, animals lost again in Cetacean Community v.
President of the United States. 30 7 The court specifically relied on
Hawaiian Crow's flawed interpretation of ESA in concluding that
the cetaceans lacked standing.0 ' The court did not apply the law
to the facts to determine whether the Cetacean Community could
satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum of injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressibility.0 9 Instead, the court declared that the
animals lacked standing. Hindsight confirms what would have
resulted if the court had applied the three-part test for standing.
Roughly eighty species of whales, dolphins, and porpoises, referred
304 Id. at 1177 (quoting Marbled Murrelet, Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber
Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
305 Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears et al. v.
Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1981). The status of the wilderness itself as
a party to the case is evocative of Justice Douglas's famous dissent in Sierra
Club v. Morton. "The voice of the inanimate object ... should not be stilled."
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 749 (1972). The values advanced by Justice
Douglas in his dissent are different from the values that have caused the courts
to accord substantive rights to animals and recognize that they have standing,
through their guardians, to vindicate those rights. He writes of inanimate
objects, and sentience is not his concern. He offers the observation that "[tihe
problem is to make certain that the inanimate objects, which are the very core
of America's beauty, have spokes [persons] before they are destroyed." Id. at 745.
306 Cabinet Mountains, 510 F. Supp. at 1189-91; see also, Hawksbill Sea Turtle
v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461 (3rd Cir. 1997) (declining to
determine whether animal plaintiffs had standing, because standing of other
parties rendered such a determination unnecessary; also noting in dicta that it
"is far from clear" that animals have standing); Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp.
581, 615-18 (D. Mass. 1997) (deciding that human plaintiff cannot bring suit on
behalf of animals, because animals lack standing); Gluckman v. American
Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that animals have no
standing to sue).
307 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Haw. 2003).
308 Id.
309 Id. at 1214.
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to collectively in the complaint as the Cetacean Community,3 1 °
asked the court to prohibit the Navy from testing a SONAR-
emitting device. The plaintiffs alleged the device caused a direct
threat to their well-being."' They offered an example of an injury
that had occurred three years earlier, an injury similar to the
injury they sought to prevent. Six whales died in the Bahamas in
March of 2000 after becoming beached in an area where the Navy
was using SONAR.3"2 The Navy acknowledged at the time of these
deaths that the presence of its SONAR was a factor in the whales'
deaths.313 Again, the existence of the irreducible constitutional
minimum is self-evident. If the Navy indeed tests this SONAR, the
mammals may become confused, and some may become beached
and die. These facts demonstrate an injury-in-fact that is palpable,
concrete, distinct, and imminent. The injury will be caused by the
defendant's use of the SONAR, and a ruling favorable to the
plaintiffs will put an end to the SONAR use, redressing the wrong
done to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs more than adequately established the irreduc-
ible constitutional minimum. Nevertheless, the court concluded
they lacked standing.314 As was the case with the 'Alala, hindsight
provides a clear answer to the question of standing. The Seattle
Post-Intelligencer reports that dead porpoises were found beached
or floating in the area of the Navy's testing directly after the tests
were conducted that the Cetacean Community tried unsuccessfully
to stop.31
5
On appeal of Cetacean Community, the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged that animals are capable of suffering an Article III injury,
but then failed to evaluate the facts of the case in light of the
310 Id. at 1208 n.1.
311 Id. at 1208.
312 Navy Did Research, Should Get OK for New SONAR, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr.
21, 2002, at J4.
313 Id.
314 Cetacean Cmty., 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1209-11.
31 5 Robert McClure, Sonar Tied to Whale Deaths, SEArLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 9, 2003, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/Iocal/143166_whales09.
html.
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irreducible constitutional minimum.316 Instead, the Court errone-
ously concluded that only Congress could confer standing on
animals.317
Each of these cases involved allegations of a claimant within
the zone of interests of the statute, who had suffered her own,
particularized, non-generalized injury-in-fact, caused by the
defendants' violation of the law, and redressable by a favorable
court ruling.
The above-described decisions are inconsistent, with some
courts recognizing an animal's standing and others not, and no
court holding up the facts of the case to the law of standing, to see
if there is a fit. These ipse dixit decisions are unfair. They have no
place in a society that honors the rule of law. They damage our
jurisprudence regarding animals and ourjurisprudence as a whole.
The courts should uniformly adopt a principled, reasoned rationale
for making standing determinations in cases involving animals.
The decisions regarding the standing of animals are, for the
most part, devoid of rationale or content. The courts that wish to
allow animals to be parties state that animals have standing. In
contrast, the courts that wish to prevent animals from being
parties state that they lack standing. The decisions are nothing
more than an exercise of raw power over helpless creatures.
The current state of the law is parallel to an amusement
park's rule that a person must be at least five feet tall to ride the
Monster Coaster. Instead of allowing individuals to stand next to
a measuring stick, however, the amusement park manager simply
pronounces which people are five feet tall and which are not. A six
foot man approaches, and the manager says, "You are over five
feet," so the man is allowed to ride the Monster Coaster. Then a
four-foot tall child approaches, and the manager inexplicably
declares, "You are over five feet," and the child climbs into the car.
Next, another six-foot tall person approaches, and the manager
declares, ipse dixit, "You are below five feet in height." The person
protests, but the manager is in charge of who can ride and who
cannot, and refuses to use the measuring stick. He uses the
language of measurement, but not the measurement itself.
316 Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
311 Id. at 1176.
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Decisions made by measuring the potential riders against a
measuring stick would be valid. Similarly, a determination as to
whether any animal has standing is valid if the facts of the case
are measured against the yardstick of the established jurispru-
dence of standing. In Cetacean Community, the Ninth Circuit went
so far as to pick up the measuring stick by enumerating the three
elements of constitutional standing. However, the court did not
hold the measuring stick next to the amusement park guest to
determine whether he was tall enough to ride; that is, the court did
not apply the elements of standing to the facts presented by the
plaintiffs to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing.318
D. Speaking Flesh onto Bone in Actions Arising from Statutes:
The Endangered Species Act Does Not Repeal the Constitu-
tion
Professor Sunstein has examined whether animals have rights
and whether they have standing. He concludes that animals have
certain rights but lack the standing to ask a court to vindicate
those rights.319 Professor Sunstein may reach too narrow a
conclusion because of the presupposition on which his analysis is
based: that the only way a claimant can have standing is for
Congress to confer it. Professor Sunstein writes that " [i]f Congress
has not given standing to animals, the issue is at an end."32 ° Many
court decisions regarding the standing of animals, including most
cited in this Article, involve a federal statute.321 Entry into federal
court, however, does not depend exclusively on the choice of the
Congress, but first and foremost on the Constitution. Otherwise,
there could be no common law actions in state and federal courts.
A claimant who has no cause of action cannot come into court, but
the existence of that cause of action pursuant to case law or statute
is a separate question from whether the claimant has standing to
bring such an action. The standing issue depends on the Constitu-
tion. There are four primary ways that any claimant can make her
318 Id. at 1174-77.
319 Sunstein, Tribute, supra note 206, at 1333.
320 Id. at 1359.
321 See supra notes 257-317.
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way into federal court. First, a claimant can have a common law
right of action and the standing to bring such an action in the
absence of any congressional enactment.322 Second, a claimant can
bring an action pursuant to an express private suit provision of a
federal statute.3 23 Third, a claimant arguably within the zone of
interests protected can challenge agency action or inaction under
APA, if no other court remedy is available.3 24 Fourth, a court can
recognize, and a claimant can bring, a private right of action
implied in a federal statute.32 5
This fourth avenue deserves special attention, because it holds
much promise for courts deciding cases involving the torture from
which two industries derive their profits. Cases involving the
concept of an implied right of action based on federal statute are
so numerous that the United States Supreme Court has referred
to them as "legion."32" To bring an implied private action, the
claimant must establish that Congress unambiguously intended
the statute to benefit the plaintiff, that the protection provided by
the statute is not so vague that enforcement would strain the
competence of the judiciary, and that the statute is unambiguously
binding on the [defendant] .327 Both HMSA and AWA were enacted
specifically to protect animals. Although AWA in particular suffers
from vagueness at some points, neither law is so impossible to
interpret that it would strain the competence of the judiciary.2
322 If Professor Sunstein's approach is taken to be universal, it conflicts with
court decisions examining the standing of claimants who bring suit pursuant to
the common law. See Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (deciding
whether class member with "exposure-only" claims in mass tort has suffered an
injury-in-fact); In re Brown, 342 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding whether a
partnership had suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to the management
company's actions).
312 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
324 Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 400 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 2005).
325 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001).
326 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287; see also Jackson v. Board of Education, 125 S. Ct.
1497 (2005); Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 273.
327 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); see also Cannon v. Univ.
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).32 See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2002); Animal
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The statutes are unambiguously binding, respectively, on the
owners and employees of slaughterhouses, and on research lab-
oratories and their employees.32 9 Thus, there is no impediment to
concluding that an implied cause of action exists. Consideration of
the suffering of animals in slaughterhouses and research laborato-
ries, which cause that suffering, and how the suffering can be
stopped, makes clear that animals who suffer because of HMSA
and AWA violations have standing. Given the existence of a cause
of action, and the animals' standing to sue, courts have the power
to end the torture that for decades has belied our claim to be a
compassionate people.
There is no compelling reason to conclude, as Professor
Sunstein has, that words like "person" and "individual" in such
statutes as ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
necessarily exclude animals. As described in subsequent sections
of this Article, both U.S. law and social norms treat animals as
"individuals," which is one of the terms used to define the "person"
who may bring suit pursuant to laws such as ESA or APA.
Standing is not confined to the private suit provisions of
federal statutes. The starting point for determining whether a
cause of action exists is a statute or common law. The starting
point for determining whether a claimant has standing, in
contrast, is the Constitution. Examination of the "case" and
"controversy" provisions of Article III reveals that nothing in the
determination of the irreducible constitutional minimum depends
on species.33 ° There is no barrier to Article III standing for animals,
for the simple reason that Article III raises no such barrier. Courts
should look to statutes and common law to determine the existence
Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2002).
329 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902; 7 U.S.C. §§ 2137, 2140, 2143.
... There appears to have been no litigation related to whether an animal is a
citizen, a determination that would be necessary in cases where jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship. In cases arising under federal statute, whether
the cause of action is express or implied, an animal's guardian can clear the
standing hurdle by establishing that the animal has suffered an injury-in-fact,
caused by the defendant's violation, redressible by a favorable court decision and
that any applicable standards of prudential standing have been satisfied.
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of a cause of action; then, if a cause of action exists, courts should
look to the Constitution and to prudential rules to determine
whether any particular claimant, including an animal in a proper
case, has standing to bring that action.
Some of the confusion found in the case law and the commen-
taries regarding animal standing arises in part from conflating two
distinct questions: whether a cause of action exists and whether a
particular plaintiff has standing to assert such a cause of action.
The courts should address the existence of a cause of action first
for two reasons. First, the standing question cannot be answered
without reference to the substantive law under which the claimant
seeks relief. Second, the existence vel non of the cause of action can
be resolved without resort to the Constitution, thus obviating in
some cases the need to resolve a constitutional question. If no
cause of action exists, no one can sue. If a cause of action exists,
the court should then make the determinations regarding
constitutional standing by considering whether the plaintiff can
establish injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility. If the
plaintiff overcomes these hurdles as well as any applicable issues
of prudential standing, the court should allow him to proceed,
because Article III knows nothing of species.
The reason that decisions about animal standing lack any
hint of rhyme or reason is that the judges making these decisions
very rarely give any consideration to the actual principles of
standing. Instead, they play the part of the amusement park
manager, telling the six-foot tall man, "You are under five feet, so
you cannot ride." Three district courts and one court of appeals
have denied standing to animals who appeared capable of making
the requisite showing of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibil-
ity. These cases, Hawaiian Crow,331 C.E.A.S.E.,3 32 and Cetacean
"' Hawaiian Crow ('Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991); see also
supra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
3312 Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England
Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993); see also supra notes 297-301 and
accompanying text.
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Community,333 were wrongly decided, for at least three reasons.
First, the courts' use of the private suit provision of ESA is wrong-
headed and utterly without precedent. No court-other than these
three-has used a private suit provision to deny standing to a
claimant who meets all standing requirements, both constitutional
and, if applicable, prudential.3 34 Second, there can be no more
appropriate use of a statute's private suit provision than to protect
the very class of creatures whose suffering Congress specifically
intended to relieve. Third, use of the private suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act to deprive a litigant of standing is
particularly inappropriate given the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Bennett v. Spear,335 which established that the private suit
provision in ESA (relied on or referred to in all three decisions)
enlarges, rather than contracts, the class of claimants with
standing to sue pursuant to the Act.336
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the private suit
provision of ESA, relied on or referred to by each court in the
Hawaiian Crow/C.E.A.S.E. /Cetacean Community trilogy, has the
effect of enlarging the class of claimants with standing, rather
than contracting it, as the respective courts erroneously held.337 In
Bennett, the Court came to this conclusion by eliminating concerns
of prudential standing and setting the bar of standing at the most
generous level possible: the irreducible constitutional minimum.338
The Court concluded that ranchers and others who were not within
the zone of interests protected by ESA could sue nevertheless,
because Congress had eliminated consideration of prudential
standing factors (such as the zone of interests test) when it enacted
the private suit provision of ESA. 339 The Court held that
333 Cetacean Community v. President of the United States, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206
(D. Haw. 2003), affd, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 307-17
and accompanying text.334 See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
335 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 162.
339 Id. at 163.
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the conclusion of expanded standing [under ESA]
follows a fortiori from [the] decision in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., which held that standing
was expanded to the full extent permitted under
Article III by [the provision] of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 that authorized "[any person who claims to
have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice" to sue for violations of the Act.34 °
Bennett leaves no doubt as to how far a private suit provision
expands standing: "to the full extent permitted under Article
III." 34 ' Nothing in Article III even hints that an animal who can
establish the elements of constitutional standing loses that
standing by virtue of his species. Article III requires injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressibility-not opposable thumbs.
Although Bennett does not expressly overrule or even mention
Hawaiian Crow or C.E.A.S.E., it does establish that the private
suit provision of ESA expands the class of claimants who have
standing to sue under that Act by eliminating considerations of
prudential standing and moving the bar as low as it can go: the
irreducible constitutional minimum.
As previously noted, neither Hawaiian Crow nor C.E.A.S.E.
nor Cetacean Community included any analysis by the court as to
whether the animals met the irreducible constitutional minimum.
Reviewing the facts of those cases confirms that the 'Alala in
Hawaiian Crow and the marine mammals in Cetacean Community
satisfied those requirements.342 In fact, the precise harm that
Hawaiian Crow asked the court to prevent in fact occurred. Since
the decision, the 'Alala has become extinct in the wild.3 43 Similarly,
because the court failed to recognize the standing of the marine
340 Id. at 163-64.
34 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972)).
342 The C.E.A.S.E. opinion does not include sufficient factual information to
support a thorough analysis of the facts in light of the requirements of
constitutional standing.343 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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mammal claimants to challenge the Navy's SONAR testing in
Cetacean Community, dead marine mammals were found floating
or beached after the testing.3 These three decisions are wrong,
not only because they fly in the face of precedent, but also because
they reject an animal's claim to standing for no other reason than
his status as an animal-an approach for which no support can be
found in Article III. A court ruling on standing should explain how
the law of standing, when applied to the facts of the case, results
in a conclusion that the animal has or lacks standing; arbitrary
decisions have no place in a nation governed by the rule of law.345
The significance of the error in Hawaiian Crow, C.E.A.S.E., and
Cetacean Community is best seen in light of the history of private
suit provisions and the courts' interpretation of such provisions.
Private suit provisions have always involved Congress's effort to
enlarge the class of claimants who have standing to bring suit.
Never before has a court purported to use a private suit provision
or APA to deny standing to a claimant who meets the irreducible
constitutional minimum as judged under the substantive law. aa6 A
344 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
345 One commentator concludes that animals lack standing because, inter alia,
they are property. Fiona M. St. John-Parsons, Comment, Four Legs Good, Two
Legs Bad?: The Issue of Standing in Animal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman and
its Implications for the Animal Rights Movement, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 895 (1999).
In contrast, the suggestion made in this Article is that no legitimate
determination can be made that animals are property or not, except in a
proceeding where the animals' interests are represented by their guardian.
346 Any sensible person hesitates to assert that something has "never" happened.
Still, review of scores upon scores of decisions under the following private suit
provisions confirms that no court except the three errant courts described in this
Article has ever used a private suit provision to deny Article III standing to a
party who can establish the irreducible constitutional minimum under ESA,
Clean Water Act, or Clean Air Act. APA allows suit for judicial review of agency
action under certain circumstances. A claimant must assert the substantive
rights provided for in the Act, and therefore cannot seek for example, judicial
review of an action taken by his neighbor, instead of the agency. Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). Claimants asserting substantive rights
created by the APA, like claimants asserting rights under the previously
mentioned statutes, do not lose Article III standing by virtue of the private suit
provision itself. No claimant who has Article III standing loses it by virtue of a
private suit provision. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 154.
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private suit provision should not be used to shut the courthouse
door on a party whom the Constitution would usher in, because
private suit provisions always entail an effort to enlarge, not to
contract, the class of claimants with standing. ESA does not repeal
the Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court has used these words to describe the
party with the strongest claim to enforce a federal statute:
When the suit is one challenging the legality of
governmental action or inaction, the nature and
extent of facts that must be averred ... in order to
establish standing depends considerably upon
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action
(or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordi-
narily little question that the action or inaction has
caused him injury, and that ajudgment preventing or
requiring the action will redress it.
3 47
In the face of this ruling from the highest court in the land, federal
courts nevertheless continue to ignore the redressible injuries of
animals.
Our federal courts are capable of granting justice to animals.
Yet, they contort their own rules and the law in a futile effort to
avoid, for as long as possible, the undeniably difficult and ulti-
mately unavoidable work of addressing wrongs done to animals.
The sequence of questions necessary to reach a principled
conclusion regarding standing is as follows: (1) Does the cause of
action the plaintiff seeks to bring exist-is it recognized?; (2) Can
the plaintiff satisfy the requirements of Article III standing?; (3)
If so, are there applicable rules of prudential standing, not waived
by the court, that prohibit the plaintiff from bringing the action?;
and (4) If so, has Congress, by means of a private suit provision,
eliminated those considerations of prudential standing and "reset"
the standing threshold at limits of Article III?
... Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).
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E. Speaking Flesh onto Bone in a Specialized Statutory Con-
text: Right of Action Implied Under Federal Statute
When society, through statutory law, creates protections
directed specifically to protect animals, standing is a necessary
adjunct to the substantive protection. Without it, the law will be
ignored, as is the case with HMSA and AWA. Standing is not an
elite status to be conferred only grudgingly. Rather, standing is the
only way to give effect to laws that protect individuals who have no
political power. A society that creates laws intended to protect
animals but then denies those animals standing is like a parent
who chooses to make a large bequest to a child but fails to draft a
will to effectuate that intent. With regard to politically powerless
groups like animals, a law is merely a suggestion unless members
of the powerless group protected by the law have standing to use
those laws in court for their own protection. Whenever the
government points with pride to such statutes as HMSA and AWA
without consistently recognizing the standing of animals to sue
under those statutes, it deceives the public into believing the
benign purposes expressed in the popular names are actually given
effect, when in fact the industries ignore the law. With both HMSA
and AWA, a cycle has been repeated twice, beginning with
journalistic expose, then public outrage prompting new laws,
followed by industry's failure to change, and back to journalistic
expos6. While the public believes the new laws protect the animals,
the torture continues unabated. Nothing has changed. Ending
their agony requires the clear, reasoned, uniform, and unequivocal
recognition that animals have interests and rights, and that their
guardians have standing to bring suit in order to protect those
rights.
It is inconsistent with existing jurisprudence to deny standing
to those for whom the protections of a statute were specifically
intended. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in order to sue
pursuant to an implied right of action in a federal statute, a
plaintiff must show: that Congress intended the statute to benefit
the plaintiff; that the protection provided by the statute is not so
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vague that enforcement would strain the competence of the
judiciary; and that the statute is unambiguously binding on the
defendant.3" Congress intended HMSA to protect animals in
slaughterhouses. Congress stated that
[it] finds that the use of humane methods in the
slaughter of livestock prevents needless suffering
[and accomplishes other desirable purposes]. It is
therefore declared to be the policy of the United
States that the slaughtering of livestock and the
handling of livestock in connection with slaughter
shall be carried out only by humane methods.349
The statute is unambiguously binding on slaughterhouses, and the
actions to be taken by slaughterhouse operators are clear. They
must render the animal insensible to pain before she is shackled,
hoisted, and hung by a chain, and sent to the stations of the
slaughter line.35" The Act meets the requirements for an implied
cause of action and is thus consistent with Blessing and with other
decisions that recognize an implied right of action pursuant to
federal statute,3 5' and with this Article's recommendations that an
implied cause of action exists whenever a statute was intended
specifically, even if not exclusively, to protect animals.
The purpose of AWA is, inter alia, "to insure that.., animals
intended for use in research facilities and for exhibition purposes
and as pets are provided humane care and treatment ....
However, certain AWA provisions make the law illusory by taking
away the very protections that AWA purports to grant.353 Equity
requires that the protective provisions be given effect and that the
"take-away" provisions be given no effect. Once courts remedy the
348 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
" Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2002).
350 See id. § 1902.
351 See, e.g. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
352 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-1259 (2002).
353 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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illusory nature of the law, certain AWA provisions and the
implementing regulations may provide protections to animals.
These include prohibitions against certain painful experiments and
requirements for anesthesia and painkillers. AWA makes clear
that it is the scientist and the research laboratory, among others,
who must abide by AWA.354 Where certain requirements, such as
"humane treatment," are not clearly defined, the triers of law and
fact must interpret them.
Our law is best judged, not by how we treat the powerful and
wealthy, but, as former meat inspector Holcombe wrote to Con-
gress in 1958, how we treat the "least of these" among us."'
Animals' lack of power is not an excuse to treat them ill; rather, it
is a call to "the better angels of our nature"356 to protect the most
vulnerable in our midst.
F. Speaking Flesh onto Bone in Other Types of Actions
Although this Article has focused on the private suit provision
and the implied right of action under federal statute, there is no
reason why an animal's guardian cannot bring a common law
action under state or federal law, if a cause of action exists and the
animal has standing. Whether such a cause of action exists for
anyone is a separate and distinct question from whether animals
have standing to bring such an action. Whether an animal has
standing to bring any type of action is a determination to be made
in each individual case, based upon applicable rules of constitu-
tional and prudential standing.3 57
54 7 U.S.C. § 2132(e).
3" See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
356 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1981) 35, available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html.
351 See supra Part IV.A-B.
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V. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SENTIENCE AND STANDING
Some judges have described animals as "uniquely incapable of
defending their own interests in court."358 Yet animals are not
unique in their inability to defend their interests in court. Virtu-
ally every type of personal property is incapable of defending its
interests in court. A ship is incapable of defending its own interests
in court, as is money against which the government has filed a
forfeiture action. A desk is incapable of defending its own interests
(regular dusting? well-organized drawers?) in court. Chalk is
incapable of defending its own interests in court.
These judges' description of animals omits an important
qualifier. Animals are not unique in their inability to defend their
own interests in court. Animals are unique among sentient beings
in their inability to defend their own interests in court.
These judges' description is incomplete in another respect.
Animals are not unique in their inability to defend their own
interests in court. A person in a coma is incapable of defending his
own interests in court. He cannot speak or feed himself, much less
ascend the witness stand and plead his case. A six-month old child
is incapable of defending her interests in court. If she has a life-
threatening but treatable disease, which her parents refuse to
have treated because of their religious beliefs, the child cannot
express her preferences; she cannot testify; she cannot seek relief.
Yet, the court will consider the interests of the comatose man and
the six-month old child through the device of appointing a guard-
ian ad litem-a person to come to court and represent the best
interests of the person who cannot defend his own interests
without help. Many courts do not recognize guardians or guardians
ad litem who seek access to the courts in order to protect an
animal's best interests. Thus, animals are unique among sentient
beings in both their ability to defend their interests in court, and
the failure of most courts to allow the animal's guardian to proceed
on behalf of the animal.
35 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Animal Welfare Inst. V. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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As described in Part IV, court decisions regarding the standing
of animals are wildly inconsistent because of the courts' refusal to
analyze the facts of the case pursuant to the established jurispru-
dence of standing. Little sense can be made by comparing the court
decisions regarding the standing of animals. Another perspective
from which to view standing is to compare animals to other
potential or actual claimants. Patterns found in such a comparison
may lead to a principled jurisprudence of animal standing.
A vast array of persons and entities have been allowed to
bring an action in U.S. state and federal courts, including humans,
churches,359 corporations,... and others. Much larger is the class of
entities and things that have never had suit brought on their
behalf. These non-plaintiffs, no more lifeless than a corporation,
include ink, tardiness, the grave, hail, chalk, time, bicycles, a hole
in one, and thousands of others. In cases where courts refuse to
recognize the standing of animals, they are not shutting the
courthouse door on an utterly unimaginable plaintiff, because
this putative plaintiff can suffer.
One type of injury our courts can redress is referred to as the
pain injury. It is the type of injury that could make the claimant
call out, "Stop it! That hurts!" The pain injury would include
mental suffering, physical suffering, injury, and death. The other
type of injury our courts recognize is the monetary injury-a wrong
which causes loss of wages, destruction of property, and other such
injuries. The two types of injuries can both occur in the same
transaction, and they can both be recovered in the same action,
where appropriate. For example, a boy whose mother is killed
through negligence will suffer the pain injury of missing her and
the monetary injury of losing her income.
Analysis of the legal standing of animals requires a review of
these two types of injuries and who can, and cannot, experience
them. The following diagram shows who can suffer which type of
injury.
... Ferry Pass United Methodist Church v. Carnesi,537 U.S. 1190 (2003).
360 United Nuclear Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. 340 F.2d 133 (1st Cir.
1965).
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a hole in one
chalk
The circle on the left is the set of potential plaintiffs who can
suffer a pain injury. The circle on the right is the set of potential
plaintiffs who can suffer a monetary injury. Humans are the only
litigants who can experience both the pain injury and the mone-
tary injury and are therefore pictured in the intersection of both
sets. To the right of humans are some of the potential plaintiffs
who can suffer only the monetary injury: corporations, churches,
etc. To the left of humans is the only potential plaintiff who shares
with the human the ability to suffer the pain injury.
Outside of the sets are things that will never be a plaintiff:
ink, tardiness, hail, time, a hole in one, bicycles, chalk, and the
grave. As seen in this context, animals are not the plaintiffs whom
we can never imagine coming into court. The plaintiffs we can
never imagine coming into court are those who are outside the
sets-the ones who are incapable of suffering either the monetary
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injury or the pain injury. Animals, by contrast, suffer one of the
injuries our courts can remedy: the pain injury.
To the right of humans in the diagram are those potential
plaintiffs who are connected to us because we own them, or they
hold our money, or they advocate for a political position with which
we agree. We are connected to them by financial and political ties,
and they cannot suffer the pain injury. To the left of humans in the
diagram are the only other potential plaintiffs, besides humans,
who can suffer the pain injury. Although courts readily and
uniformly recognize the standing of the non-humans who can
suffer the monetary injury, some courts are unwilling to recognize
the standing of the only non-humans who can suffer the pain
injury-animals. Even though only animals join us in susceptibil-
ity to the pain injury, some courts hesitate to hear the causes of
these, our companions in the knowledge of life and death, flesh and
blood. Animals are unique in their status as penniless, powerless
sufferers. They are the only creatures in whom the fates have
melded the capacity for anguish with the lifelong ability to escape
their tormentors.3 6 ' For this reason, they need the protection of
our courts.
Courts construing statutes to determine whether an animal's
guardian can sue pursuant to a statute need not become entangled
in parsing definitions of "person" or "individual." Both our law and
our societal norms establish that an animal is an individual. Our
courts routinely recognize that animals are individuals. For
example, courts acknowledge that the protection of a species can
be different from the protection of an individual animal,362 that a
section of the Clean Water Act does not differentiate between harm
to individual animals and harm to the species as a whole,363 that
Congress has given the Department of the Interior the discretion
361 The animals in the two settings considered in this Article, slaughterhouses
and research laboratories, are unable to escape their tormentors. So are the dogs
in puppy mills and the chickens on the factory farm. Some animals do have the
capacity to escape those who would injure or kill them. For example, some wild
animals being hunted may escape.362 See, e.g., Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1281,
1288 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001).
363 See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir.
2003).
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whether to focus more on a reintroduced population or on individu-
als animals, 31 the well-established fact that individual animals
can and do lose ESA protection simply by moving about the
landscape,365 that the Navy's use of SONAR in peacetime is
acceptable because the Navy took into consideration the possible
effect on individual animals,366 and that it may seem "obvious that
it can never be to the advantage of an individual animal to be
killed. 367
Animals are individuals who suffer. Therefore, courts should
uniformly recognize their standing.
VI. ANIMALs, STANDING, AND THE COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
We have entered a century in which we can no longer ignore
the suffering and the standing of animals. As we craft a principled
jurisprudence to address their pain, ancient teaching offers a
starting point.
A. The Animal /Human Dichotomy: A Chasm Too Great?
Jesus of Nazareth told the story of a rich man, clothed in the
finest linen, and the beggar Lazarus, 368 full of sores, who sat at the
gate and asked for the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table.369
Both died, with the beggar borne by angels to the comforts of
heaven and the rich man consigned to the miseries of hell. In
torment, the rich man "lift[ed] up his eyes " 37° and saw the Old
Testament figure Abraham, father of the faithful, far away. The
rich man cried out, "Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send
34 See Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir.
2000).
365 See id. at 1235.
366 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp.2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
367 Comm. For Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 310 n.30
(D.D.C. 1976).
36 Lazarus is not to be confused with the Lazarus whom Jesus is said to have
raised from the dead.
369 Luke 16:19-3 1.
370 Id. at 16:23.
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Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my
tongue; for I am tormented in this flame."37' Abraham refused this
plea. "[B] etween us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they
which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass
to us, that would come from thence."372 We use our laws to fix such
chasms. We look at another being, who is both like us in some
ways and different in others, and use our law to fix a chasm
between us. We require little in the way ofjustification or fairness;
we simply fix the chasm. In our history as a nation, chasms
separating us from other sentient beings have always ultimately
been bridged. The only exception that remains is the chasm
between the human animal and the non-human animal.
Africans were brought to this country against their will and
forced into lives of slavery.3 73 To perpetuate that system, to treat
them as property, we used the law to make them "other," to fix a
vast chasm between us and them. By our laws we created a system
under which the African "had no rights that the white man was
bound to respect."3 74 We later bridged that chasm and filled it in,
though imperfectly, with laws and enactments including the
Emancipation Proclamation, 375 the post-Civil War Amendments to
the Constitution,3 76 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 377
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United
States into World War II, citizens not of Japanese descent looked
at Japanese citizens and legal residents and chose to view them as
"other." We fixed a chasm between ourselves and them. By means
of an Executive Order, we had them, though they were guilty of
nothing but being different, rounded up and placed in internment
371 Id. at 16:24.
372 Id. at 16:26.
171 In drawing this analogy with respectful intent, mindful of its imperfections,
one remembers the words of the Pulitzer Prize winning African American
woman Alice Walker, author of, among other works, The Color Purple: "The
animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for
humans any more than black people were made for whites or women for men."
Walker, supra note 46, at 14.
314 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
371 Issued January 1, 1863, by President Abraham Lincoln, declaring all persons
held as slaves in the states of the Confederacy to be free.37 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, & XV.
377 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000(h)(6) (2002).
754
IN THE VALLEY OF THE DRY BONES
camps.3 78 By 1988, we no longer saw Japanese within the United
States as "other;" at least not to the extent that we had after Pearl
Harbor. Congress passed a law providing reparations for those
individuals who were interned, along with an apology made by
the President on behalf of the nation, and an acknowledgment of
the injustice of our acts .1 9 Again, at least to an extent, we bridged
the chasm.
Upon the founding of this nation, we considered women
sufficiently "other" that most women were not allowed to vote until
1920.380 Many other examples exist, both in this country and
elsewhere, of using the law to create a chasm between us and those
whose needs may not be considered very important. In some cases,
this artificial chasm is made so large that we cannot dip our finger
in the water to cool their tongues as they burn in the fires of hell.
Among the most prominent international examples is the Nazi
Holocaust, which used a well-planned public relations program to
persuade the German people that humans such as Jews, Gypsies,
and homosexuals were "other."
38
'
A basic, oft-quoted maxim of law and ethics is that fairness
requires like cases to be treated alike.38 2 The difficulty lies in
deciding which characteristics matter in determining "likeness."
Rational ability cannot be the crucial factor in determining
likeness or difference between animals and humans. Humans with
low intelligence and animals who communicate using sign
language or specialized keyboards demonstrate that a distinction
based on rationality is invalid.383 Certainly, humans and some
animals share a degree of intelligence and the capacity to commu-
nicate.38 4 We ignore the suffering of animals and define them as
"other" so we can use them-their flesh our food, their labor our
378 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 F.R. 1407, Feb. 19, 1942 (authorizing the internment
of Japanese Americans).
379 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
380 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women the right to vote).
31 Genocide in the 20th Century, The History Place, at http://www.historyplace.
com/worldhistory/genocide/holocaust.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
382 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
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luxury, their writhing our funding. To bridge that chasm we must
see that the difference that matters is not rationality, communica-
tion or usefulness; it is, as nineteenth century philosopher Jeremy
Bentham understood, the ability to suffer.1 5 In this frailty-this
capacity for anguish, humans and animals are bound together in
a kinship deeper, older, and more powerful than history, science,
or law.
The ability to suffer is the principal characteristic for purposes
of animal standing for two reasons. First, suffering is the appropri-
ate measure for standing determinations because case law amply
demonstrates that a showing of physical injury or suffering can
constitute injury-in-fact. Physical proximity to a danger,8 6 the
threat to physical well-being posed by airborne pollutants,8 7 and
exposure to harmful emissions388 are all among the physical
injuries, actual or imminent, that courts have recognized as
adequate. Any animal that suffers has established an inj ury-in-fact
and, thus, has standing if the other two elements exist.8 9 Second,
the history of our laws, culture, and religions demonstrates that
the guiding principle on which our society is based-the first thing
required of each member of that society-is that we hurt no one.
Whatever strain of spirituality or humanism is considered, the
primary principles are that we do no harm and that we show
390compassion.
385 Bentham wrote the words that would become a rallying cry for the animal
rights movement: "The question is not Can they speak, nor Can they reason,
but Can they suffer." JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGLISLATION, ch. XVII (1781), available at http://www.
constitution.org/jb/pml.htm.
386 Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632-33 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving human
exposure to downed cows in stockyards).
387 Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003).
388 LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir. 2002).
319 See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
390 Ahisma, the ethic of non-harm, formed the basis for Mohandas Gandhi's
theory of non-violence. It is a central tenet of the eastern religion Jainism. VI
THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 86 (Samuel
M. Jackson ed., 1949).
Hinduism, in one of its holy texts, teaches this prayer:".... May I regard
all beings with the eye of a friend. With the eye of a friend do we regard one
another!" The Yajur Veda 36:18 (Devi Chand trans., 1965).
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What, then, is our reaction, through our law, when we see39'
a living, conscious cow, hanging upside down by one shackled leg
from the slaughter line that moves her toward the "belly ripper?"
What is our response when we see that cow move her head and her
The definitive ethical precept of Wicca is, "If it harm none, do as you will."
MARGOT ADLER, DRAWING DOWN THE MOON 101 (1986).
Some Old Testament passages can be read as reflecting compassion for
animals. For example, God told Adam and Eve, "Behold, I have given you every
herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the
which is the fruit of a tree, yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat." Genesis 1:9.
Ancient Hebrew compassion for animals is also found in the command "not [to]
muzzle the ox when he tread[s] out the corn." Deuteronomy 25:4. It is also
reflected in the Old Testament wisdom that a "righteous man regardeth the life
of his beast: but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." Proverbs 12:10.
Jesus taught that we should love our neighbor as ourselves, a precept
derived from Old Testament law. A religious lawyer hoping to trick Jesus posed
to him the question asked by many of us who are tempted to view someone
different as "other." He asked, "who is my neighbour?" Jesus answered by telling
the story of a man on a dangerous journey who fell among thieves and was
robbed, beaten, stripped of his clothing and left half dead. Luke 10:30. Two
religious leaders of his own faith saw him as he lay on the road, turned their
backs on his suffering, passed him by, and went on their way. Luke 10:31-32.
Then a despised Samaritan came upon the injured man,
and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to
him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set
him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care
of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two
pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care
of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again,
I will repay thee.
Luke 10:33-35.
For the atheist and the humanist, scientific facts establish that these
animals feel pain, the highest human response to which is compassion.
391 Seeing is what enabled the good Samaritan to be filled with compassion. One
difficulty we face is the inability actually to see these animals, with our own
eyes. Some whistleblowers' video exists, such as the slaughterhouse video on the
Washington Post's Web site, but we are left, for the most part, to see these
animals in our mind's eye. We thereby lose the ability of the Good Samaritan to
see the sufferer and be moved with compassion, unless we can see the animal
and its situation through words.
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leg, in an effort to get away from the slaughter line? One choice is
to view the cow as "other," because she does not look like us.
Another choice is to see the cow, with compassion, and to help her.
Our law will vary, depending on the choice we make.
When we see a pig trapped in a transport truck outside a
slaughterhouse in Illinois for several days with temperatures in
the high nineties, what is our response? What do we want this tool,
our law, to do in that dusty field on that hot day? Will we bridge
the chasm between the pig and us and dip our finger in the water
and cool her tongue? And having cooled her tongue, will we leave
her there to be sent down the slaughter line where she will kick
and squeal as she is lowered into scalding water that will fill her
lungs and drown her? Or will we look on her with compassion and
help her?
When we see a dog hanging in an immobilizing harness and
subjected to uncontrollable, inescapable electric shocks at a level
that would make a grown woman lose control of her muscles, what
will we do? Will we, like the Good Samaritan, be moved with
compassion and use our legal system to take the dog in and care
for him?
Our legal system, particularly through the inadequacies and
failures of HMSA, AWA, and our standing decisions, has allowed
suffering to go on behind closed doors. Most judges, law professors,
lawyers, and lay people, like the good Samaritan, would be "moved
with compassion" to stop this suffering, if they saw it in person,
on a dusty road in Israel or in Illinois. Reading or hearing the
suffering described are the only available means to see the acts
taking place. They are the only basis upon which we can decide
whether to be moved with compassion or to refuse a drop of water
because of the great chasm that we have fixed between humans
and animals.
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B. Is There a Chasm? The Expanding Genus Homo, the
Human/Animal Chimera, and Bridging the Chasm Between
Humans and Animals
The chasm we are tempted to fix between animals and
ourselves is not so wide or so permanent as we sometimes think.
Courts insisting on that chasm, clinging to a strict animal/human
dichotomy, are on a collision course with science and ethics.
When the poet Thomas Hardy learned of the sinking of the
Titanic, he contemplated the iceberg that had been forming in the
Atlantic even as the ship was being built, and he wrote of their
destiny:
And as the smart ship grew
In stature, grace, and hue,
In shadowy silent distance grew the Iceberg too.
Alien they seemed to be:
No mortal eye could see
The intimate welding of their later history,
Or sign that they were bent
By paths coincident
On being anon twin halves of one august event,
Till the Spinner of the Years
Says, "NOW!" and each one hears,
And consummation comes, and jars two hemispheres. 392
Courts that have not addressed the rights and standing of
animals may be heading towards an encounter with science that
similarly will "jar two hemispheres." For example, technology
exists today to produce an animal/human hybrid, also known as an
animal/human chimera, based on the name of an ancient mythical
3"92 Thomas Hardy, The Convergence of the Twain, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF
THOMAS HARDY 307 (James Gibson ed., 1976).
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creature, a she-monster, which breathes fire and comprises goat,
lion, and serpent.393 In 1998, scientists reported that they had
created a cow/human hybrid through cell division. 94 However, it
was destroyed while still in the embryo stage.395
A court insisting on a stark human/animal dichotomy would
face a difficult decision when presented with a human/monkey
chimera. Many courts recognize both the standing and the
substantive rights of animals. How will courts that do not recog-
nize those rights and that standing respond when a
human/chimpanzee chimera walks up to the witness stand, takes
the oath, and asks the court to prevent the corporation that created
him from subjecting him to painful experiments?
Bioethicist Ruth Faden of Johns Hopkins University believes
that "[tihe big worry is the blurring between humans and
nonhumans in such a way that the new creatures would challenge
us as to whether they would be treated like humans."396 She
dispenses with that problem by saying that, "any number of
policies could head that off." It seems that Dr. Faden views the
"problem" as how to draft the right policy to make sure the issue
is "headed off;" to make certain the chimera on the witness stand
will hear that his case is dismissed, see the gavel come down and
393 See Maryann Mott, Animal-Human Hybrids Spark Controversy, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Jan. 25,2005), available at http://news.nationalgeographic.
com/news/2005/01/0125_050lf25_chimeras.html.
39' David Longtin & Duane C. Kraemer, Cloning Red Herrings: Why Concerns
About Human-Animal Experiments are Overblown, 111 POLY REV. (2002),
available at http://www.policyreview.org/FEB02/longtin-print.html. In addition,
Chinese scientists created a human/rabbit chimera, from which they took
embryonic stem cells. Karby Leggett, China Has Tightened Genetic Regulations:
Rules Ban Human Cloning; Moves Could Quiet Critics of Freewheeling Research,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2003, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.
com/cna/finance/markets/2003/031013_china2.htm. It is not completely clear
which type of clones the cow/human and the rabbit/human were. There are two
types of clones, one of which has the potential to grow into a full-grown being
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be hustled off to the laboratory again. Given what she says, the
bioethicist appears to believe that the existence of an
animal/human chimera would not call on scientists and courts to
consider in earnest what rights must be afforded to such a
creature. She appears instead to believe that the problem is how
to make sure that question is answered the way she wants it
answered, regardless of the feelings and suffering of this creature
on the witness stand, this Caliban who never asked to live.
As the Titanic is described in Hardy's poem,39 v courts which
have not recognized the legal rights and standing of animals may
find themselves on a collision course with the advances of science
in the form of the animal/human chimera. The suggestion for a
principled and consistent approach to the law of standing for
animals is offered as a means to avoid such a collision. A venerable
maxim says "hard cases make bad law."39 Courts could suddenly
find themselves having to scramble, unprepared, to weigh a
scientist's assertion of the right to "head off' any pesky claims an
human/animal chimera might make, against the claims of the
chimera himself. In such a situation, courts would also have to
contend with the multitude of amici that may ask to express their
views, while the court tries to avoid such embarrassing
computations as those that were used many decades ago to
determine who was mulatto and who was not.3 99 For this reason,
a principled approach to the law of standing should be applied by
all courts.
The chimera may not be the only non-human who may
challenge the anthropocentrism of our courts in coming years. Also
approaching the bar of justice is the chimpanzee. The National
Academy of Sciences recently reported that human DNA is 99.4
percent identical to chimpanzee DNA and that the two species
397 See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
398 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Vulture Min. & Mill. Co., 55 P.2d 636, 643 (1936)
(Lockwood, C.J., dissenting).
399 See, e.g., McGoodwin v. Shelby, 206 S.W. 625 (Ky. App. 1918).
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share a common ancestor.4 ° ° They also concluded that the
chimpanzee, rather than branching off from this common ancestor
at a time significantly earlier than the human, branched off at
very nearly the same time as the human.40 1 Based on these
conclusions, the scientists recommended that our current
taxonomy be changed, so that the genus homo, which has been
reserved exclusively for humans, be expanded so that it will
include homo sapiens (human), homo troglodytes (common
chimpanzee) and homo paniscus (bonobo chimpanzee).4 °2
These scientific findings will likely be cited in support of the
Great Ape Project's Declaration on Great Apes.403 The proponents
of the Declaration on Great Apes support certain basic rights for
humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans.4"4 These
include the right to life, the protection of individual liberty, and
the prohibition against torture.4 °5
Only by recognizing that Article III presents no obstacle to the
standing of animals can our courts apply meaning to the concept
of standing. Such an act of recreation will have a dual salutary
effect. It will give effect to the compassionate purposes of laws like
HMSA and AWA, and allow the animal standing jurisprudence to
develop before the courts are faced with the case of the chimera or
the chimpanzee.
CONCLUSION
A just system treats like cases alike. The rules of standing
require an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility. Any
properly motivated guardian capable of establishing standing
should have the opportunity to come into court and make a claim
on behalf of any animal capable of feeling pain.
400 Wildman et al., Implications of Natural Selection in Shaping 99.4%
Nonsynonymous DNA Identity Between Humans and Chimpanzees: Enlarging
Genus Homo, 100 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 7181 (2003).
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Declaration on Great Apes, Great Ape Project, at http://www.greatapeproject.
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Our world is changing. Judges have an unprecedented
opportunity to stand in the Valley of the Dry Bones and, by the
power of their words, speak the flesh of meaning onto the dry dead
bones of the word "standing." Scientific advances inevitably
require adjustments to our legal system's treatment of animals.
Hardy's poem described an unplanned, tragic encounter between
two great forces.4 °6 However, T.S. Eliot illustrates a far different
meeting in these lines from Part 5 of Little Gidding, in The Four
Quartets:
We die with the dying:
See, they depart, and we go with them.
We are born with the dead:
See, they return, and bring us with them.
The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree
Are of equal duration. A people without history
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern
Of timeless moments. So, while the light fails
On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel
History is now and England." 7
From that recognition of unity, of a perpetual cycle of death
and rebirth, of the wholeness of all time and all places, Eliot hears,
and would have us hear, a series of evocative voices: the Love, the
Calling, and the waterfall."' The last voice Eliot has us hear is
young and hidden and human: the children half heard between two
waves of the sea.40 9 We are called to go back to the place where we
first began this eternal cycle of beginning and ending. This time,
however, we are invited to recognize the place.
406 Hardy, supra note 392, at 307. The description "unplanned" is from the
perspective of the ship's passengers, though not from the perspective of the
Spinner of Years.407 T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding, in T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 58 (1943).
408 Id. at 59.
409 Id.
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With the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Through the unknown, unremembered gate
When the last of earth left to discover
Is that which was the beginning;
At the source of the longest river
The voice of the hidden waterfall
And the children in the apple-tree
Not known, because not looked for
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
Between two waves of the sea.
Quick now, here, now, always-
A condition of complete simplicity
(Costing not less than everything)
And all shall be well and
All manner of thing shall be well
When the tongues of flame are in-folded
Into the crowned knot of fire
And the fire and the rose are one. 1°
To this point in our experience, our compassion for animals
cannot find the way. We are weary with well-doing, from the
pointless, repetitious cycle of routine violations, expose, public
outcry, congressional action, and back to routine violations. We are
weary with giving it all we have and learning that all we have has
not yet done the job. We feed live chickens into a wood chipper; we
pour paint thinner into the bladders of conscious rats; we subject
living, breathing, sensate animals to inescapable electric shock.
Our courts have divorced standing from its meaning, with the
result that they, like some Calvinist God, send certain animals to
the hell of the laboratory and the slaughterhouse, while allowing
others the protections of the courts-all without any explanation
whatsoever. Our only hope is to find the last of Earth left to
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discover, at the source of the longest river, and know the place for
the first time. When we enfold the "other" as the rose enfolds the
flame, we find ourselves and find simplicity. Those who would rob
the law of its heart-its knowledge of pain and pleasure, its bent
toward compassion-risk Hardy's collision between machine and
ice. We are free to choose the rose and flame instead-to bring into
the circle of our compassion animals, who, as we, suffer anguish
and who, as we, look to our courts as the last hope to assuage that
anguish.
